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ABSTRACT 
Prior to the 2004 federal election the Australian Greens were rising as the third force in 
the Australian political system. At the 2001 election they secured an increased share of 
the vote and returned a second Senator. Conversely the Australian Democrats, held to 
be the third force in Australian politics went backwards in 2001, losing a Senate seat. 
From 2001 to 2004 the Greens polled strongly and were buoyed by increased support 
for their anti-Iraq war and pro-refugee positions. As a party they appeared to be moving 
beyond single-issue status. Equally the Democrats were suffering from internal disunity 
and their support collapsed. By the time of the 2004 election the Greens were expected 
to win enough Senate seats to at least share the balance of power in the Senate. These 
high expectations were held by political commentators and the Greens themselves, 
buoyed by strong polling. This dissertation examines the expectations placed on the 
Greens. While it was found that expectations were too high, the Greens nevertheless 
had the capacity to perform better than they did in the Senate. The Greens' 
underperformance at the 2004 federal election is generally consistent with 'constraints 
theory'. While institutional barriers to minor party representation in the Australian 
parliament provided the greatest constraint on the Greens' election performance, this 
dissertation also examines the impact of government and media attacks on the Greens 
during the 2004 election campaign and the Australian Embassy bombing on the Greens' 
election results. 
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CHAPTERl 
iNTRODUCTION 
The Australian Greens were expected to perfonn strongly at the 2004 federal election. 
Underpinning support for the Greens was growing public disaffection toward the major 
parties over their positions on the Iraq war and asylum seekers. At the start of the 2004 
election campaign, opinion polls, the Commentariat and the Greens' leadership were 
fuelling expectations that the Greens could win between four and seven Senate seats and 
either hold the balance of power in their own right or share it with the remaining 
Democrat Senators. Greens' leader Bob Brown even raised the possibility of the Greens 
winning seats in the House of Representatives and determining which of the major 
parties fonned government in the event of a hung parliament (Bachelard & Denholm, 
2004; ABC Radio AM, 9 September 2004). The Greens, however, fell well short of 
these expectations. Only two Greens' candidates were elected to the Senate, increasing 
their total to four. The Greens did not win election to the House ofRepresentatives and 
their only sitting member, Michael Organ, lost his seat of Cunningham (Newman, 2005, 
p.65-73). They even failed to win the three Senate seats they needed to secure o1t1ciai 
parliamentary party status. On the other hand the Howard government was returned for 
a fourth consecutive tenn with an increased majority in the House of Representatives 
and control of the Senate - the first time a government controlled the Senate in 24 years 
(Manning & Rootes, 2005, p.403-4). 
The disparity between the expectations that the Greens would perform strongly and the 
outcome of the 2004 election raises the question of whether the Greens under perfonned 
or whether expectations were in fact too high. Analysis of the expectations placed on 
the Greens, suggests that they were too high. However, the Greens should have 
performed better than they did in the Senate. After establishing that the Greens shouid 
have had four candidates elected to the Senate, 'constraints theory' is utilised to provide 
an explanation for why the Greens under perfonned at the 2004 federal election. 
'Constraints theory' is a convenient tenn for the Jaensch and Mathieson's (1998, pp.21-
3) application ofHauss and Rayside's (1978) theory of party fonnation to the study of 
minor parties in Australia. Wniie government and media attacks on the Greens and the 
terrorist bombing of the Australian Embassy in Jakarta were the major issues the Greens 
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confronted during the 2004 election campaign, institutional barriers provided the 
greatest constraint on the Greens' election performance. 
This study provides a contribution to the study of minor parties in Australia. In 
particular, it provides an original contribution to the study of the Australian Greens. 
Despite being founded over a decade ago, the Australian Greens remain relatively 
neglected by Australian political scientists. It also provides an account of the Greens' 
performance at the 2004 election, something that has been inadequately considered. 
Methodology 
A wide range of resources were utilised for information on the Greens at the 2004 
election, including newspaper reports, election data, parliamentary reports, press 
releases and, where they were available, journal articles. An analysis of the 2004 
Senate election results was undertaken to determine the extent to which the electoral 
system and Senate preferences affected the Greens' election results. A content analysis 
of news reports and opinion pieces in Australia's major national and state newspapers 
was undertaken to establish whether there was bias against the Greens as a prerequisite 
to determining whether it damaged the Greens' electoral support. The newspapers 
included in the content analysis were T'he Australian, The Sydney Morning Herald, 
Herald Sun, The Age, The Courier Mail, The West Australian, The Advertiser and The 
Mercury. News reports were classified as 'unfavourable', 'neutral' or 'favourable'. 
These categories refer to whether the content of a news story reflected positively or 
negatively on the Greens. The results of the content analysis are contained in 
Appendices Hand I. Opinion poll data and data from the Australian Election Study 
(AES) 2001 and 2004 were utilised to determine the impact of the government and 
media attacks on the Greens. Opinion poll data were also used to determine the impact 
of the terrorist bombing on the Australian Embassy in Jakarta on the Greens' election 
results. While opinion poll data at the national level provides a crude measure for 
gauging support for the Greens, it was the only measure that was readily available. 
While the 2001 and 2004 AES data show respondents' attitudes toward the Greens 
changed, it does not indicate what changed their attitudes and at what time between the 
200 I and 2004 elections attitudinal change occurred. 
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Findings 
This study found that the expectations placed on the Greens in the lead up to the 2004 
federal election were too high. However, a comparison of polling on the Greens with 
the Democrats' Senate election results in 1998 and 2001 suggests the Greens under 
performed by only having two candidates elected to the Senate in 2004. An analysis of 
why the Greens under performed found that institutional barriers provided the greatest 
constraint on the Greens' election perfonnance. The content analysis of press coverage 
on the Greens during the election campaign revealed that only the Herald Sun's 
coverage was biased against the Greens. However, opinion polls and AES data indicate 
that the attacks on the Greens by government, minor parties, interest groups and 
sections of the media did not have a detrimental impact on the Greens' election results. 
Unexpectedly the terrorist bombing on the Australian Embassy in Jakarta was found to 
have had the greatest impact on support for the Greens. However, it was insufficient to 
overcome the institutional constraints that stifled the Greens' election performance. 
While 'constraints theory' provides an adequate explanatory framework for assessing 
the Greens' underperformance, it was unable to explain why some Greens' voters 
shifted their support to the Howard government following the Jakarta bombing. This 
suggests 'constraints theory' could be extended to include terrorism as a potential 
political constraint on the electoral success of minor parties. 
Chapter Outline 
Chapter Two shows the expectations placed on the Greens in the lead up to the 2004 
federal election were too high, but that they still under pertormed. After outlining the 
rise of the Australian Greens this Chapter shows how opinion polls, the Commentariat 
and the Greens' leadership all fuelled expectations of a strong Greens' electoral 
perfonna."lce. A comparison of polling on the Greens during the 2004 election 
campaign with the Democrats' Senate eiection results in 1998 and 2001 suggests the 
Greens had the capacity to perform better than they did in the Senate. However, while it 
was plausible for commentators to predict that the Greens could win four Senate seats, 
their predictions of five to seven seats were unrealistic. Claims by the Greens that they 
could win lower House seats were also unrealistic because minor party candidates have 
historically failed to win election to the House of Representatives. 
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Having showed that the Greens under performed in Chapter Two, Chapter Three utilises 
'constraints theory' as a theoretical framework for explaining why the Greens under 
perfonned. 'Constraints theory' contends that institutional, political and internal party 
factors constrain the electoral success of minor parties. Institutional factors include the 
Australian electoral system and the stability of Australia's two party system. Political 
factors encompass the behaviour of the major parties, economic conditions, whether a 
minor party has geographically based support and the media. Internal factors include 
the popularity and profile of a party's leader, finances and resources, ideology and 
policy and party experience (Jaensch & Mathieson, 1998, pp21-3, 173-196). 
Chapter Four shows the Greens' underperformance at the 2004 federal election is 
relatively consistent with 'constraints theory'. While the electoral system was the 
dominant constraint on the Greens this Chapter also considers the impact of 
government, minor party, interest group and media attacks on the Greens during the 
2004 election campaign. A content analysis of Australia's major newspapers is used to 
assess whether there was systematic bias against the Greens during the campaign 
period. The full details of the content analysis are contained in Appendices H and I. 
While the Greens had limited media opportunities to counter the attacks on them the 
available evidence suggests the attacks did not have a detrimental impact on their 
election results. The 9 September 2004 terrorist bombing of the Australian Embassy in 
Jakarta has been neglected in analyses of the Greens' election results. Opinion polis 
suggest the Embassy bombing had the most detrimental impact on the Greens' vote. 
However, even without the loss of support caused by the bombing the Greens would not 
have been able to surmount the institutional barriers that constrained their performance. 
Whilst the 2004 federal election saw Greens' representation in parliament equal the 
Democrats', the Greens under performed. Political commentators and the Greens' 
leadership expected the Greens to become the clear third force in Australian politics. 
Current opinion polling and Commentariat analysis indicates that the Greens remain on 
the rise while the Democrats continue to flat line (AC Nielsen, 2005; Roy Morgan 
Research, 2003a). The next election may well see a further rise in Greens' 
parliamentary representation. If this occurs the 2004 result will be no more than a 
stepping-stone in the emergence of the Greens as a serious force in Australian politics. 
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CHAPTER2 
GREEN EXPECTATIONS: A BRIDGE TOO FAR? 
In the lead up to the 2004 federal election campaign the Greens appeared poised to gain 
omcial parliamentary party status and to eclipse the Democrats as Australia's third 
parliamentary force. 1 Opinion polls, the Commentariat and the Greens' leadership 
fuelled expectations of a strong Greens' election result. At the start of the campaign the 
various opinion polls showed support for the Greens running at between 6 and 9.5 
percent (Newspoll!The Australian, n.d.; AC Nielsen, 2004; Roy Morgan Research, 
2003a). TI1e Commentariat were predicting the Greens could win between four and 
seven Senate seats. The Greens' leadership was optimistic of winning Senate seats in 
every state and the ACT. Greens' leader Bob Brown was also confident of winning 
seats in the House ofRepresentatives. He even raised the prospect of an accord with the 
major parties in the event that the Greens held the balance of power in a hung 
parliament (Bachelard & Denholm, 2004; ABC Radio AM, 9 September 2004). These 
expectations, however, were too high. The Greens had just two additional Senators 
elected at the 2004 election, bringing their total to four, and they failed to win a seat in 
the House of Representatives. After outlining the electoral rise of the Greens this 
Chapter analyses the expectations of a strong Greens' result in 2004. A comparison of 
Greens' polling during the campaign with the Democrats' Senate results in 1998 and 
200 I suggests that expectations placed on the Greens were too high. However, they had 
scope to perform better than they did in the Senate. Claims by the Greens that they 
would enter the House of Representatives were always a bridge too fur. 
The Rise of the Australian Greens 
Support for the Greens has steadily increased since the party was founded in August 
1992 (Brown & Singer, 1996, pp.84-5). Table 1 shows the increase in the Greens' 
primary vote between the 1993 and 2001 federal elections. In 1993 the Greens fielded 
just 56 House of Representatives' candidates and won just 1.9 percent ofthe House of 
Representatives' primary vote. They performed slightly better in the Senate winning 
2.9 percent of the primary vote. The most notable feature of the Greens' debut 
1 Official party status is achieved with five seats. If affords parties extra sta.f't: office space and general 
resource assistance (Parliamentary Entitlements Act, 1990). 
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campaign was Bob Brown's contest in the Tasmanian seat ofDenison. Brown secured 
14.2 percent ofthe primary vote but failed to be elected to the House ofRepresentatives 
(AEC, 1999). In 1996 the Greens' vote increased slightly and Brown was elected to the 
Senate for Tasmania with 8.7 percent of the statewide primmy vote (Newman, 2005, 
p.70). Despite fielding more candidates at the 1998 federal election the Greens' 
primary vote fell slightly in both chambers. In the House of Representatives they 
received 2.6 percent of the primary vote and in the Senate they received 2.7 percent. 
Table 1 
The Greens' House of Representatives and Senate Election Results 1993-2001.2 
-·- ~~~-~~-"~~----r--~-- ---,~1~~ ~·l Year House of Seats Seats Senate Seats Total 
Representatives I Contested Won Primary 
1 
Won Semrturs 
Primary Vote(%) vote(%) 
1993 1.9 56j 0 2.9 1 2 
1996 2.9 106 0 32 1 2 
1998 2.6 123 0 2.7 0 1 
2001 5.0 150 0 4.9 2 2 
Source: Australian Electoral Commission (1999); Newman, (2004). 
The Greens' vote almost doubled at the 2001 election, doing so with a modest 22 
percent rise in the number of House of Representative seats the party contested 
compared to the 1998 election. For the first time the Greens fielded candidates in all 
House of Representatives divisions and received 5.0 percent of the national vote. In the 
Senate the Greens received 4.9 percent of first preferences and under the Senate's 
proportional representation voting system, won two seats, in Tasmania and New South 
Wales (Newman, 2005, p.54; Singleton, Aitkin, Warhurst & Jinks, 2003, p.326). The 
increase in the Greens' vote in the 2001 fuderal election came largely as a consequence 
of their opposition to the Howard government's poiicies on border protection and 
asylum seekers rather than increased public concern for the environment (Rootes, 2002, 
p.150; Economou, 2002, p.2; Lohrey, 2002, p.56). The convergence of the major 
parties on boarder protection provided the Greens with an electoral advantage by 
~ Shows t.~e combined vote of the Australia.>J. Greens a.>J.d t.~e Greens (W A). The Greens (W A) did not 
formally join the Australian Greens until October 2003 (Greens (WA), 2004). 
3 According to Christoff (1994, pp.359-360) Green candidates contested 59 House of Representatives 
divisions in the 1993 federal election. This table has used Australian Electoral Commission (1999) data 
which shows 56 seats. 
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differentiating them fi·om both major parties.4 Although the Greens did not win any 
seats in the House of Representatives in 2001, Greens' candidate Michael Organ was 
elected to the House of Representatives at the October 2002 Cunningham by-election. 
Organ was ultimately able to win Cunningham because of the Liberal's decision not to 
run a candidate (Lohrey, 2002, p.63). 
Following the 2001 election support tor the Democrats declined substantially due to the 
leadership struggle between Natasha Stott Despoja and Meg Lees, and the inability of 
the Democrat party organisation to effectively deal with the parliamentary leadership 
tensions. In contrast the Greens gained a significant degree of media attention because 
of their stance on various issues. The Greens became widely known for their opposition 
to the Howard govemment's policies on boarder protection and asylum seekers. They 
also gained media attention from Bob Brown's very public opposition to the Howard 
government's commitment to the US-led war on Iraq. The Greens gained widespread 
media attention from Senators Bob Brown and Kerry Nettle's 'parliamentary protest' 
during US President George W. Bush's address to a joint sitting of the Australian 
parliament (Norman, 2004, p.208; Kingston, 2004, p.188). They gained further 
attention the following day when Brown and Nettle were forcefully prevented from 
attending Chinese President Hu Jin Tao's address to a joint sitting of the Australian 
parliament (Norman, 2004, p.209). The media's focus was also on the Greens in early 
2005 when new Labor Leader Mark Latham toured Tasmania's Styx valley with Bob 
Brown. The increased profile of the Greens helped to reinforce expectations that the 
Greens were set to become the third parliamentary force at the 2004 federal election. 
The Greens were expected to perfonn strongly at the 2004 election on the back of a 
protest vote against the Howard Government. Journalist Malcohn Farr identified a 
phenomenon he referred to as 'doctors' wives'. These were women who planned to 
vote for the Greens because they wanted to punish the Howard government over its 
policies on asylum seekers and Iraq. According to Kerr (2004, p.6): 
The 'doctors' wives' are not seriously troubled by financial pressure and have 
plenty of time to think about other issues. They have opposed the Government's 
border protection policy and cannot forgive John Howard for Tampa. Now they 
4 Major party convergence theory suggests the Liberal and Labor parties are becoming closer on the 
Left/Right political spectrum as they vie for the middle ground. This forces centrist minor parties to the 
Left or Right of the major parries (Vromen & Gelber, 2005, p.222). Border protection was an example of 
major party convergence. 
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are angty over Australia's presence in Iraq. They are appalled by the atrocities 
committed on Iraqi prisoners and believe Australia has been tarnished. Like 
most Australians they didn't want us to sign on for the war and now they are 
ready to punish the government. 
Farr specificaily warns that their backlash couid be felt in seats such as 
Wentworth, and adds that the doctors' wives could also influence Senate 
contests, with the Liberals the losers. 
During the 2004 federal election campaign opinion polls showed the Greens out polling 
all other minor parties, but they also provided a mixed picture as to the strength of 
Greens' support. Newspoil had the Greens poiling between 6 and 8 percent during the 
election campaign. In the last two weeks of the campaign Newspoll had support for the 
Greens steady at 7 percent (Newspoll/The Australian, n.d.).5 AC Nielsen had the 
Greens polling at between 8 and 9 percent for most of the campaign. In the final week 
of the campaign, however, AC Nielsen had the Greens at 7 percent (AC Nielsen, 2004).6 
Morgan Poil had the Greens perfonning more strongly. Morgan Poil showed support 
for the Greens between at 7.5 and 10.5 percent. In the week prior to the election 
Morgan Poll had the Greens polling at 9.5 percent (Roy Morgan Research, 2003a)? A 
Herald Poll, conducted by AC Nielsen in the final week of the election campaign, 
showed support for the Greens in the Senate at a high of 12 percent (Dodson, 2004; 
Contractor, 2004; Coleman, 2004a; Manning & Rootes, 2005, p.403).8 
Opinion polling indicated Greens' preferences were an important factor for the outcome 
of the election (Saunders, 2004b). Throughout the election campaign all three opinion 
polls showed Labor well behind the Coalition on primary votes.9 However, up until the 
last week of the campaign both Newspoll and Morgan Poll showed Labor either neck 
and neck or ahead of the Coalition on a two party preferred basis.10 AC Nielson was the 
only opinion poll that showed Labor behind the Coalition on primary votes and the two 
party preferred vote. I I 
5 See Appendix A 
6 See Appendix A L 
7 See Appendix A2. 
8 A Bulletin-Nine poll of more than 1000 people published on 29 September 2004 showed support for the 
Greens in the Senate at 14 percent in South Australia, l3 percent in NSW and Queensland and 12 percent 
in Victoria (Latham eyes Lodge but Greens the big movers, 2004). 
9 See Appendices A to A.2. 
10 See Appendix B and B.l. 
11 See Appendix B.2. 
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The Commentariat Gets it Wrong 
Political commentators expected the Greens to win between four and seven Senate 
seats. Foilowing the 2001 election Lohrey (2002, p.59) argued that based on voting 
trends the Greens would overtake the Democrats as Australia's third political force at 
the 2004 federal election. Her statistical analysis of the Democrats and the Greens' 
1996, 1998 and 2001 election results showed a decline in the Democrat vote and an 
increase in the Greens' vote. In the Senate the Democrat vote dropped from 10.8 per 
--centin 1996 to 7.2 per-centin2UUL Jn_fue same-period-the-Greens' vote grew from 3.2 
per cent to 4.9 percent. In line with the expected increase in the Greens' vote, Lohrey 
(2002) predicted the Greens would win four Senate seats at the 2004 election, in NSW, 
Victoria, Western Australia and Tasmania. The youth of the Greens in Queensland and 
the strength of the Democrats in South Australia made it was more likely the sitting 
Democrat Senators would hold their seats. Tne Greens were unlikely to win a Senate 
place in the ACT or Northern Territory because no minor party had even come close to 
reaching the 33.3 percent quota necessary to win (Lohrey, 2002, pp.60-3). However, 
during the election campaign Lohrey (2004a; 2004b) predicted the Greens could win as 
many as seven Senate seats. The best-case scenario incorporated the Greens winning 
additional Senate seats in Queensland, South Australia and the ACT. 
At the outset ofthe 2004 election campaign Professor Malcolm Mackerras predicted the 
Greens would win a Senate seats in every state (Mackerras, 2004b; Manning & Rootes, 
2005, p.403). He predicted that all three Democrat Senators who were up for re-
election, and former Democrat leader turned founder of the Australian Progressive 
Alliance, Meg Lees, would lose their seats. Mackerras, therefore, predicted that in the 
new Senate the Coalition would hold 38 seats, Labor 26, the Greens 8 and the 
Democrats 4 (Mackerras, 2004b). However, following the release of party preference 
tickets and limited opinion polling on Senate voting intentions, Mackerras revised his 
Senate prediction (Mackerras, 2004a). He concluded that Labor and the Greens would 
not benefit from their preference deals and that the only certainty was that the 
Coalition's vote would increase. His prediction about the Greens was revised down to 
three seats. He expected the Greens to only win in New South Wales, Western 
Australia and Tasmania. Mackerras' revised prediction gave the Coalition 35 seats, 
Labor 28, the Democrats 5, the Greens 5 and Family First 1 in the new Senate 
(Mackerras, 2004a). 
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Antony Green, the ABC's election analyst, reached a different conclusion to that of 
Mackerras. Based on his analysis of party voting tickets for the Senate, Green predicted 
the Greens could win four to six Senate seats (Green, 2004). In New South Wales 
Green predicted the Coalition would win three. seats and Labor two. He expected the 
Greens to secure between 8 and I 0 percent ofthe primary vote and win the final Senate 
place. Green believed the Coalition and Labor would each win three seats in Victoria. 
The decision by conservative parties to channel preferences to Labor suggested a 
deliberate attempt to split the state between the major parties to prevent the Greens from 
winning. The decision by Labor and the Democrats to preference Family First ahead of 
the Greens meant the Greens would require close to a quota ( 14.3 percent) in their own 
right to win the final Senate place. In Queensland Green predicted the Liberals and 
Labor would each win two seats with the Greens winning the fifth place and the 
National's Barnaby Joyce the sixth Senate spot. 
In Western Australia Green (2004) expected the Coalition to win three seats, Labor two 
and the Greens one. He believed South Australia was the hardest state to predict. 
Green believed the most likely outcome would see the Coalition win three seats, Labor 
two and either the Greens, the Democrats or Family First would win the final place. In 
Tasmania Green predicted the Liberals would win two seats, Labor three and the Greens 
one. In the ACT and the Northern Territory Green predicted the major parties would 
each win one seat. However, he believed the Greens had a chance of winning a seat in 
the ACT if they could keep the Liberal vote below the 33.3 percent quota and ifthe 
Green vote was higher than Labor's surplus above 33.3 percent (Green, 2004). 
The Poll Bludger12 (n.d.) also predicted the Greens would perform strongly in the 
Senate. The Poll Bludger predicted the Coalition would win 19 seats, Labor 14, the 
Greens 5 and the Democrats and Family First would each win I seat. In NSW, Victoria, 
Queensland and Western Australia, the Coalition was expected to win three seats, Labor 
two and the Greens one. In South Australia the Poll Bludger predicted the Coalition 
would win three seats, Labor two and the Democrats one. In Tasmania both the 
Coalition and Labor w~re expected to win two seats with the Greens and Family First 
each winning one. While the Greens were polling strongly in the ACT the Coalition 
and Labor were expected to win one seat each in the ACT and Northern Territory (The 
12 The Poll Bludger is a website that provides information about Australian politics. This information was 
accessed at http://www.pollbludger.com/sen2004.htm [2005, January 3]. 
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Poll Bludger, n.d. ). Therefore, the Comrnentariat held great expectations that the 
Greens would perfonn strongly at the 2004 election and would most likely share the 
balance of power in the Senate with the Democrats. 
The Greens Aim Too High 
At the start of the election campaign the Greens themselves were confident of winning 
four to seven Senate seats (Manning & Rootes, 2005, p.403). Party leader Bob Brown 
expected the Greens to win close to one million votes (Bennett, Newman & Kopras, 
2005, p.lO) and secure 8 to 10 percent ofthe national Senate vote (Dodson, 2004). 
Brown was confident of winning 3 to 4 Senate seats but believed the Greens had a 
strong chance of winning seats in evety state and the ACT (Greens to pick up four seats, 
says Brown, 2004; Channel Nine's Sunday, 5 September 2004b). 
I think Christine Milne will pick up a seat in Tasmania. David Ristrom in 
Victoria- he's a Melbourne City cmmcillor. And John Kay in New South 
Wales. Rachel Siewert in Western Australia, and our candidates Drew Hutton in 
Brisbane and Brian Noonan in South Australia, they've all got good chances . 
... and of course ... Kerry Tucker in the ACT- put a line through the middle of 
that, and if we pick up three seats we'll be going extremely well, party status, 
and we'll be a vezy fonnidable and responsible Senate component, sharing the 
balance of power with the DemocratL.. (Bob Brown interviewed on Channel 
Nine's Sunday, 5 September 2004b). 
The Greens' Senate candidate for Tasmania, Christine Milne, was also optimistic. 
Milne expected the Greens to have a candidate elected in evety state and possibly the 
ACT (Bachelard & Denholm, 2004 ). She believed the 2004 federal election would be 
'the Green election' (Bachelard & Denholm, 2004; Denholm, 2004). 
This is going to be the Green election. Spring is here and the country is turning 
green (Christine Milne, cited in De11J10lm, 2004). 
At the beginning of the campaign-The Australian and the ABC reported that the Greens 
could win seats in the House of Representatives and determine which of the major 
parties governed in the event of a hung parliament (Bachelard & Denholm, 2004; ABC 
Radio AM, 9 September 2004). The Greens' leadership was confident of winning the 
seats of Sydney and Melbourne and retaining the seat of Cunningham (Channel Nine's 
Sunday, 5 September 2004b; Nettle, 2004 ). It was also considered possible that the 
Greens could win the New South Wales' seat of Grayndler (Bacheiard & Denholm, 
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2004). Lindsay Tanner, the Labor member for Melbourne, considered the Greens his 
real opposition. 
At the 2001 election the Greens gave Tanner a few nervous moments (Economou, 2002, 
p .1 ). They polled 16 percent of the primary vote in the seat of Melbourne but after the 
distribution of preferences the Greens were only 3.5 percent behind the Liberal 
candidate. Because of the tendency of the major parties to preference each other last, if 
the Greens had finished ahead of the Liberal candidate they would have won the seat 
ahead of Labor with Liberal preferences. This scenario further contributed to 
speculation that the seats of Sydney and Grayndler could be won by the Greens 
(Bachelard & Denholm, 2004 ). The idea of winning seats in the House of 
Representatives led Brown to raise the possibility of an accord with the major parties in 
the event of a hung parliament (ABC Radio AM, 9 September 2004; The 7.30 Report, 8 
September 2004b ). It can be seen that Commentariat and Green party expectations were 
very high. 
2004 Election Results: Disappointment 
In keeping with opinion polling prior to the election, the Greens' vote increased at the 
2004 federal election. Nationally the Greens' House of Representatives primary vote 
increased 2.2 percent to 7.2 percent. 13 Whereas at the 2001 election the Greens polled 
10 percent or more of the primary vote in eight electorates, in 2004 they polll 0 percent 
or more in 27 electorates, a more than threefold increase (Economou, 2002, p.l; AEC, 
2005a, pp.B0-206). 14 However, despite polling strongly in the seats of Sydney 
(21.6%), Grayndler (21.1 %), Cunningham (20.1 %) and Melbourne (19.0%), the Greens 
did not win election to the House of Representatives and their only sitting member, 
Michael Organ, lost his seat of Cunningham (ARC, 2005a, p.B0-206). Greens' 
preferences for the House of Representatives had little impact on the election result. 
Out of the sixty-one seats that were decided on preferences, Greens' preferences helped 
Labor candidates over the line in twenty-nine seats (AEC, 2005a, ppl30-206; AEC, 
2005b ). Greens' preferences contributed to the defeat of sitting members in just three 
seats, Adelaide, Parramatta and Richmond (AEC, 2005a, pp130-206; Bennett, Newman 
& Kopras, 2005, p.40). 
13 See Appendix C. 
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The Greens performed better in the Senate. Nationally the Greens' Senate primary vote 
increased 3.3 percent to 7. 7 percent. is This increase is made more significant given that 
at both the 2001 and 2004 elections the Greens contested all 150 House of 
Representatives seats, yet it was their Senate vote that grew more substantially. The 
Greens primary vote was 16.4 percent in the ACT, 13.3 percent in Tasmania, 8.8 
percent in Victoria, 8.1 percent in Western Australia, 7.6 percent in the Northern 
Territory and 7.3 percent in NSW. The Greens did not perform as well in South 
Australia (6.6 percent) and Queensland (5.4 percent) (AEC, 2004a, p.120-2). On the 
back of their Senate performance, however, the Greens only had two candidates elected, 
Christine Milne in Tasmania and Rachel Siewert in Western Australia, bringing their 
total number of Senators to four. Despite doubling their numbers in the Senate they fell 
short of the predicted four to seven Senate seats and the five seats required to secure 
funding and staffing allocations attached to parliamentary party status. 
A comparison between opllllon polling on the Greens during the 2004 election 
campaign and the Democrats' Senate results in 1998 and 200 I suggests that predictions 
that the Greens could win five to seven Senate seats were always unlikely. The 
disparity in opinion polls should have caused the Commentariat to be more cautious in 
their predictions. Even though one poll indicated support for the Greens in the Senate 
as high as 12 percent, the Greens have historically polled the same in the Senate as the 
House of Representatives. Therefore, predictions should have been based on the Greens 
securing 7 to 9 percent of the vote. In the 1998 and 2001 elections the Democrats 
secured between 7 and 9 percent of the Senate vote and won only four seats. In 1998 
the Democrats secured 8.5 percent of the national Senate vote and won four seats. In 
2001 the Democrats averaged 7.2 percent of the Senate primary vote and again won 
only four seats (Newman, 2005, pp.53-4). It foliows that a prediction that the Greens 
could have won four seats was more plausible and that expectations were too high. 
Claims by the Greens that they could win seats in the House of Representatives were 
unrealistic. Beside the National Party and a small number of Independent candidates, 
minor parties have historically been unsuccessful at winning election to the House of 
Representatives. Even high profile minor party candidates have failed to be elected to 
.the House of Representatives. At the 1990 federal election former Australian Democrat 
14 See Appendix C. I. 
15 See Appen(,iix D. 
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leader Janine Haines contested the South Australian seat of Kingston. Despite receiving 
considerable media coverage and winning 24.4 percent of the primary vote, she failed to 
be elected. Also in 1990 high profile anti-nuclear campaigner Helen Caldicott contested 
the NSW seat ofRichmond. Despite securing 23.3 percent ofthe vote she also failed to 
win the seat (Bennett, 1999, p.ll). In the 1998 election a number of One Nation 
candidates won over 20 percent of the primary vote but failed to be elected. Most 
notably Pauline Hanson won 36.0 percent ofthe vote in the Queensland seat ofBlair but 
failed to win the seat because both major parties preferenced against her (AEC, 1999). 
In 1998 the Democrats' John Schumann won 22.4 percent of the vote in the South 
Australian seat of Mayo, but also failed to receive enough preferences to win (Bennett, 
1999, p.ll). Winning seats in the House of Representatives is very difficult for minor 
parties without geographically based support. 
Conchtsion 
In the lead up to the 2004 federal election the Greens appeared poised to become the 
third parliamentary force in Australian politics. The collapse in support for the 
Democrats due to internal leadership tensions and public dissatisfaction with the major 
parties over their positions on asylum seekers and the Iraq war fed support for the 
Greens. At the start of the 2004 campaign, opinion polls, the Commentariat and the 
Greens' leadership fuelled expectations that the Greens would perform strongly. 
Opinion polls showed the Greens polling between 6 and 10 percent with one poll 
putting their Senate vote at 12 percent. The Commentariat predicted the Greens could 
win four to seven Senate seats while the Greens' leadership were confident of winning 
up to seven Senate seats and even entering the House of Representatives. The Greens, 
however, fell well short of these expectations. They only won two additional Senate 
seats and failed to break into the House of Representatives. An analysis of minor party 
election results in the Senate and House of Representatives indicates that the Greens had 
greater scope to perform better than they actually did in the Senate but expectations of 
entering the House of Representatives were a bridge too far. Chapter Three outlines 
'constraints theory' as a theoretical framework for explaining why the Greens under 
performed at the 2004 federal election. 
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CHAPTER3 
'CONSTRAINTS THEORY' AND MINOR PARTIES 
Minor parties have a poor record of having candidates elected to Australian parliaments. 
Between 1910 and 1996 523 minor parties formed in Australia (Jaensch & Mathies(m, 
1998, p.26). During the same time, 387 minor parties contested at least one election and 
251 minor party candidates were elected to state, territory or federal legislatures 
(Jaensch & Mathieson, 1998, p.209). 'Constraints theory' contends that institutional, 
political and internal factors constrain the electoral success16 of minor parties (Jaensch 
and Mathieson, 1998, p.l73 ). Institutional factors include the electoral system and the 
two party system. Political factors include the behaviour of major parties, economic 
conditions, whether a minor party has geographically based support and the media. 
Internal factors encompass the profile and popularity of a party's leader, finances and 
resources, a party's ideological position, policy focus and a party's level of experienc'e. 
While institutional and political factors can either constrain or facilitate the success of 
minor parties the media and internal factors are almost purely detrimental to minor 
parties (Jaensch & Mathieson, 1998, p.190). 'Constraints theory' is a convenient term 
that refers to Jaensch and Mathieson's (1998, pp.21-3, 173-196) application ofHuass 
and Rayside's (1978) theory of party formation to the study ofthe success and failure of 
minor parties in Australia. This Chapter outlines 'constraints theory' as a way of 
gaining insight into the Greens' underperformance at the 2004 federal election. 
Institutional Constraints 
Electoral systems are the most significant constraint on the electoral success of minor 
parties (Jaensch and Mathieson, 1998, p.173; Papadakis & Bean, 1995, p.97; Bean & 
Papadakis, 2005, p.ll1 ). Majoritarian electoral systems are the least beneficial for 
minor parties, whereas electoral systems based on proportional representation (PR) 
provide the best opportunity for minor parties to gain electoral representation. This is 
because PR establishes a much lower threshold for candidates to be elected. Two 
electoral systems operate for the Australian Commonwealth Parliament. The House of 
Representatives uses majoritarian compulsory preferential voting, also known as the 
16 Success for minor parties can be defined more broadlyfuanjust 'electoral success'. Jaensch and 
Mathieson's (1998, p.l73) study of minor parties in Australia defmes success in terms of 'longevity of 
existence and.breadth of development' as well as 'electoral success'. 
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'alternative vote', while the Senate uses a form ofPR known as the 'single transferable 
vote' (Papadakis & Bean, 1995, p.100). The House of Representative has 150 single 
member electorates and candidates require 50 percent of the vote plus one vote to be 
elected.17 The high electoral tbJ:eshold effectively bars the election of minor party 
candidates other than Coalition partner the National Party. 18 As noted in Chapter Two, 
even high profile minor party candidates have failed to secure enough votes to gain 
election to the House of Representatives. For instance, at the 2004 federal election 
Labor's candidate for the seat of Richmond, Justine Eiiiot, received the lowest primary 
vote of any candidate to be elected to the House of Representatives. Eiiiot won 35.6 
percent of the primary vote. In comparison the Greens' candidate for the seat of 
Sydney, Jenny Leong, received the highest primary vote of any minor party candidate. 
Leong won was just 21.6 percent of first preferences (Australian Electoral Council, 
2005, p.). Indeed no minor party candidate has succeeded in being elected to the House 
of Representatives at a general election in the post-War period (Papadakis & Bean, 
1995, p.l03). 
Minor parties have had greater success at being elected to the Senate since PR was 
introduced for Senate elections in 1949 (Richmond, 1978, p.322). Sharman (1999, 
p.357) notes that the election of minor party candidates was an unintended consequence 
of the adoption of PR The major parties believed the original quota of 17 percent was 
prohibitive to minor parties. The Country/National Party was the only minor party to 
consistently poll over 17 percent. The Senate's electoral system is based on six state 
and two territory multi~member electorates with PR operating at a state rather than a 
national level (Papadakis & Bean, 1995, p.101). Since the Senate was expanded in 
1984 to 76 the states have had twelve representatives and the territories two. For 
normal half senate elections candidates require 14.3 percent of the vote. A quota is 
calculated as follows (Miragliotta, 1999, p.79; Papadakis & Bean, 1995, p.lOI): 
17 Voters are required to number their ballot paper in preferential order agaiTISt the names of candidates . 
. If a candidate fails to be elected on first preferences the candidate with the least number of votes is 
eliminated from counting and his or her second preference votes are redistributed among the remaining 
candidates. Tnis process is repeated until a candidate gains 50 percent of the vote plus one vote. 
l& The National Party's voter identification is geographically based, namely rural constituencies. Most 
minor parties, such as the Greens, derive voter identification on an "issues" basis (see Warhurst, 1997). 
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F onnal ballots 
Quota= ______ _ +1 
Vacant seats ( + 1) 
A quota is considerably higher in the territories, with candidates requiring 33.3 percent 
to be elected after the distribution of preferences. In full Senate elections where all 72 
state seats become vacant the quota for election is reduced to just 7. 7 percent in each · 
state jurisdiction. 19 The relatively high Senate electoral threshold has constrained the 
number of minor parties that have been able to gain election to the Senate.20 Most 
minor party candidates have needed preferences from other parties to be elected. 
Between 1949 and 2004, 76 minor party candidates were elected to the Senate. Only 
ten were able to reach a full quota on the strength of their primary vote, and seven of 
these occurred at double dissolution elections where the quota was reduced to 7.7 
percent (Newman, 2005, pp.34-55; Miragliotta, 1999, p.i7). 
The stability of the two party system in Australia creates a limited capacity for minor 
parties to enter padiament. While the major parties' share of the primary vote for both 
the House of Representatives and Senate has fallen over the past four decades, the vast 
majority of Australians still give their first preference to one of the major parties. In the 
House of Representatives the major parties secure approximately 80 to 85 percent ofthe 
primary vote. In the Senate Australians are more likely to vote for a minor party but the 
major parties still secure nearly 80 percent of the primary vote (Bennett, 1999, p.12). In 
the Senate, where minor parties have the greatest opportunity of being elected, this 
means candidates compete for 15 to 20 percent of the vote. Because minor parties 
rarely if ever win more than one of the six available seats they have a limited capacity to 
enter parliament. Democrat dominance in Senate elections throughout the 1980s and 
90s has meant there has been little opportunity for other minor parties to gain election 
let alone achieve the five members required for parliamentary party sta~s (Newman, 
2005, p46-53). 
19 Under the Senate's complex preferential system candidates who receive more first preferences than a 
quota have their surplus votes transferred to other candidates. This process is repeated until all the quotas 
are filled (Papadakis & Bean, 1995, p.lOl). 
20 The Senate quota is relatively high with respect to state upper houses. For exa.T.ple the quota for 
el~tion to the NS\V Legislative Coa?}cil is just 4.55 percent, and the quota for election to the Sot.~ 
Australian Legislative Council is 8.4 percent (Jaensch & Mathieson, 1998, p.174-5). 
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Political Constraints 
Major party attitudes and behaviour can either facilitate or constrain the electoral 
success of minor parties. In keeping with cartel theory (Mair & Katz, 1997) major 
parties see minor parties as threats to their hegemony. The major parties have used their 
power to entrench their domination ofthe political system (Jaensch & Mathieson, 1998, 
p.l85). The threat One Nation posed to the major parties' hegemony led to collusion 
between the Coalition and Labor to preference One Nation last at the 1998 and 2001 
elections. Tnis helped stifle the development of One Nation and prevented them 
entering the parliament despite securing a strong primary vote, particularly in the 
Senate21 (Newman, 2005, pp.53-4). According to Mayer (1980, pp.354-5) the major 
parties have a range of 'weapons' at their disposal to stit1e the success of minor parties 
and protect their hegemony. They can 'strangle publicity' and 'smear and ridicule' 
minor parties. They can also 'buy off party leaders, poach key staff and alter electoral 
laws. Tony Abbott, a senior mini~ter in the Howard government, went to extraordinary 
lengths to destroy One Nation. Abbott established the Australians for Honest Politics 
Trust to covertly pursue and destroy One Nation in the courts (Kingston, 2004, p.315-
7). There are cases, however, ofthe major parties assisting some minor parties in order 
to further their own electoral interests. This is particularly seen in the relationship 
between the Liberal and National parties, but was also seen between the Liberal Party 
and the Democratic Labor Party in the 1960s (Jaensch & Mathieson, 1998, p.184). 
The trend of the major parties to 'catch-all' parties (Kircheimmer, 1996) has been 
beneficial for minor parties. The move toward the centre and the shedding of 
controversial and potentially divisive policies by the major parties has resulted in a 
proliferation of minor parties to fill the poiitical vacuum. Single-issue parties based on 
morals, racism or post-materialism have formed because of this tendency. The battle 
over the political centre by the major parties has fostered the popular view that there is 
little difterence between the Labor and Liberal parties (Jaensch & Mathieson, 1998, 
p.184). They have been referred to as tweedle dee and tweedle dumb ("Minor parties", 
n.d.). Many minor parties have formed because the major parties have not fonnulated 
specific policies on issues of considerable importance to minority groups or because 
their policies have been unacceptable to them. The bipartisan approach by the major 
parties to the issues of immigration and multiculturalism has resulted in the formation of 
21 One Nation's Len Harris was able to win a Senate seat in Queensland at the 1998 federal election 
because he was able to reach a quota on the strength ofhis primary vote (Newman, 2005, p.53). 
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a number of race based minor parties (Jaensch & Mathieson, 1998, p.184). For 
instance, the convergence of the major parties over . immigration issues and the 
economic rationalist agenda throughout the 1980s and 90s faciiitated the emergence of 
One Nation (Beresford & Phii1ips, 1999, pp.34-5). The failure of major parties to form 
poiicies on other issues such as abortion, homosexuality and euthanasia has also 
motivated the formation of parties concerned with these issues. Major parties, however, 
may appropriate minor party policies in order to cut off a minor party's potential. 
Wnere such concerns are not adopted by major parties 'the narrowness of a minor 
party's appeal may doom it to insignificance' (Jaensch & Mathieson, 1998, pp.184-5). 
Economic conditions can have a negative or positive impact on minor parties. Under 
economic conditions where there is high unemployment and increasing inflation an 
increase in political dissent and support for alternative political parties can occur. 
According to Richmond (1978, p.325) economic problems in the 1890s led to an 
increase in sympathy for the Henry George movement and the 1930s depression saw the 
rise of Social Credit parties. The high unemployment and inflation rates in the post-
197 4 period under the Whitlam government saw the formation of the Workers Party. 
Conversely, periods of strong economic growth have been associated with a lower level 
of minor party involvement in the political system. The Menzies era from 1949 to 196~ 
was a period of economic prosperity that saw a low level of minor party involvement 
(Jaensch & Mathieson, 1998, pp.185-6). Periods of economic growth may lead to 
satisfaction with the government and override other social and political concerns. 
It may be that the voters in such a period of economic health may be so satisfied 
that other social and political issues are not of sufficient concern for them to 
offer support to minor parties, they wiil be happy with the major parties, and 
especially the government (Jaensch & Mathieson, 1998, p.186). 
Minor parties also need a large geographically concentrated sectional base (Jaensch & 
Mathieson, 1998, p.l82; Bean & Papadakis, 1995, p.lll; "Minor parties", n.d.). As 
mentioned the National Party is the best example of an Australian minor party that has 
achieved relative success by having a large concentrated support base. Rural voters 
formed the National Party to represent rural interests. Historically the National Party 
has enjoyed a relatively high level of electoral support from rural voters (Jaensch & 
'Mathieson, 1998, p.182). For instance, at the 1990 federal election the National Party 
won just 8.4 percent of the nationwide House of Representatives vote while the 
19 
Democrats won 11.3 percent. Despite winning a lower nationwide vote than the 
Democrats the National Party won fourteen seats in the House of Representative while 
the Democrats won none. In 1993 the National Party's vote dropped to 7.3 percent but 
the number of seats they won increased to sixteen (Papadakis & Bean, 1995, p.102). 
However, appealing to a clear sectional base is not sufficient for a minor party to be 
successful. Other minor parties have formed to represent other sectional interests but 
have been unsuccessful. Some of these have appealed to Aborigines, the grey vote, 
women and ethnic groups. Wirile the Democratic Labor Party was relatively successful 
at winning Senate seats in the 1950s and 60s they were less successful at attracting the 
Catholic vote (Jaensch & Mathieson, 1998, p.l83). 
However, until recently the Democrats have been relatively successful despite not 
having a distinct sectional base (Jaensch & Mathieson, 1998, p.l83). Not having a clear 
base has allowed the Democrats to appeal across the political spectnun, especialiy to 
voters who have become disaftected with the major parties. However, a problem for the 
Democrats has been the volatility in their support. Up to 50 percent of the Democrat 
vote is replaced from election to election. The fragility of Democrat support means that 
they face oblivion if they perfonn poorly at two consecutive elections (Van Onselen, 
n.d., p.2). 
The Democrats emerged as a 'protest' party, offering an alternative for voters 
seeking something other than Labor or Liberal, and as a 'haven' party for those 
who, under 'compulsory voting', need a party to vote for. But, as the three 
elections in 1990, 1993 and 1996 showed, this 'protest/haven' base is very 
fragile (Jaensch & Mathieson, 1998, p.183). 
The media pose a significant barrier to minor parties. The media focus on the major 
parties because they form the government and the alternative government. Table 2 
shows the results of a content analysis of the coverage of major and minor parties in two 
Australian newspapers during the 2004 federal election campaign period. 75 percent of 
the coverage was devoted to the major parties, 8 percent to minor parties and 
independents and 17 percent to other content. Media coverage generates legitimacy 
and name recognition for minor parties (Miragliotta, 1999, p.l2). However, 'big party 
chauvinism' dominates most of the media. The DLP, for example, believed 'the media 
were the main reason for their decline because they were never able to get their message 
to the public' (Jaensch & Mathieson, 1998, p. 190). The Australian Greens have also 
complained about the difficulty of getting media attention. When representatives of 
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state and territory Green parties held a press conference on 30 August 1992 to announce 
the founding of the Australian Greens, not one television news crew turned up. Instead 
they were covering the opening of the Sydney Harbour Tunnel (Brown & Singer, 1996, 
p.85). While political advertising is perhaps the best means parties have to persuade 
voters, the cost of advertising puts a significant amount of it out of reach of minor 
parties (Young, 2002, p.81). In order to be electorally successful minor parties need 
regular media coverage and they have no guarantee of getting it. 
Minor parties have no sanctions against media enabling them to gain regular 
access which is vital. If they are 'extreme' and make a shock-public-afiairs 
stocy, they may gain some freak time. It is imperative [for minor parties] to get 
known fast- and that means lots ofregular·exposure on TV close to elections. 
[They have] no way of achieving this (Mayer, 1980, p. 351). 
Table 2 
Coverage of Major and Minor Parties in The Australian and The West Austraiian 
Newspapers During the 2004 Federal Election Campaign Period (30 August to 9 
October 2004/2 
Newspapers Major Parties Minor Parties/ Other Total 
Independents 
The Australian 859 80 222 1161 
The West Australian 393 47 73 513 
Total 1252 127 295 1674 
Internal Constraints 
The profile and popularity of a minor party's leader is an important internal factor for 
the success of minor parties. Having a popular and well know leader is a vital asset for 
the success of minor parties. High profile leaders are more readily able to attract media 
attention which allows them to sell their party's message to the voting public. 
Leadership has been an important factor in the electoral success of the Democrats 
(Bean, 1997, p.86; Forrest, 1995, p.579). Since the party was founded the Democrats 
have had high profile and popular national leaders (Bean, 1997, p.83). For example, 
22 This table refers to the total coverage of federal politics including opinion pieces. Classification is 
based on a story's main focus. Major parties refer to the Liberal!National Coalition and the Labor Party. 
Stories on the major parties focused on the leaders, the leaders' wives, policy and major party candidates. 
Stories classified as 'other' include reports and opinion pieces on interest groups, polling, data provided 
by the Australian Electoral Commission and reports that did not fit into the Major party, Minor 
party/Indepen~ent category (e.g. stories on 'celebrity politicians'). 
21 
Democrat founder Don Chipp attracted considerable media attention because he was a 
former Liberal government minister and because of his 'quirky' personality (Van 
Onselen, n.d.). The election of Bob Brown to the Senate in 1996 helped the rise of the 
Australian Greens as a result of having an outspoken leader at the national level 
(Lohrey, 2002, p.63). Strong personalities frequently dominate minor parties. It is 
often the efforts of one or two people that get an emerging minor party off the ground. 
This is seen in the founding of the Greens with the work of Drew Hutton and Bob 
Brown (Brown & Singer, 1996, p.84; Hutton & Connors, 1999, p.227). Indeed some 
minor parties are little more than their founders. Such 'personaiity parties' are usually 
only viable while their leaders are involved in the party. It is usually the case that if the 
leader leaves the party or has a 'fall from grace' the party will inevitably collapse 
(Jaensch & Mathieson, 1998, p.l94). 
Finance is a further internal constraint on minor parties (Jaensch & Mathieson, 1998, 
p.l94; ABC Radio Perth, Mornings, 28 June 2005). Even with the introduction of 
public funding major parties have still experienced serious financial pressures (Jaensch 
& Mathieson, 1998, p.194). Financial pressures are magnified for minor parties by 
having to compete in elections with fewer members and staff and far fewer resources. 
Minor parties with far [less] members and few backers than major parties, face 
even greater financial problems in either keeping full-time staff or in conducting 
an election campaign (Henderson, 1985, p.259 cited by Jaensch & Mathieson, 
1998, pp.194-5). 
While minor parties receive significant staffing and funding entitlements when they 
gain five parliamentary seats :fuw minor parties have been able to achieve this. The 
Democrats were able to cement their position in pariiament by achieving parliamentary 
party status and receiving the additional resources. Staffing entitlements enable minor 
parties to get across the detail of legislation and project an aura of competence to the 
broader public. Minor parties that appeal to a clear support base also have a greater 
ability to raise funding. The Family First Party, which competed at the federal level for 
the first time in 2004, was able to wage a million doliar advertising campaign because 
of its support from the Assembiies of God Churches (MacLean & Sinclair, 2004 ). 
·The narrow ideological and policy tocus of most minor parties is detrimental to their 
electoral success (Jaensch & Mathieson, 1998, p.l91). While maintaining a narrow 
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ideological and policy focus will retain the support of party members, it is unlikely to 
expand a party's membership and make a party electorally competitive. When a minor 
party seeks to expand its policy focus to attract new members it is likely to lose its 
traditional supporters, who were drawn to the party because of its specific policy focus. 
In order for such a party to increase its support it needs to either convince more voters 
to support its narrow policy agenda (something that is difficult due to limited resources) 
or broaden its- policy framework in an effort to attract more voters. Few parties have 
been successful at achieving either (Jaensch & Mathieson, 1998, p.191). Where parties 
have attempted to expand it has usually led to party fragmentation. In the 1980s 
differences between the left and environmentalists around Australia hindered the 
development of a national Green party. The left were opposed to the name 'Green' 
because it narrowed the public profile of the party. On the other hand environmentalists 
in NSW and Tasmania would not join if 'Green' were left out of the name. A 
compromise led to the creation of the Rainbow Alliance, but disinterest towards it by 
the mainstream environment movement and the left meant that it failed to become a 
serious alternative voice (Hutton & Connors, 1999, p.228). 
A minor party's ideological position may also act as a constraint. Doctrinal parties on 
both the extreme left and the extreme right make up a significant proportion of 
Austraiia's minor parties. Some minor parties have formed because of policy changes 
by major parties, while others have formed because of a perception that the major 
parties have not addressed a key component of policy-making. A number of minor 
parties emerged in the 1970s following the rejection of the White Australia Policy by 
the Whittam government. Moral or Christian parties emerged in the 1970s and 1980s 
because they believed <permissiveness' in society had gone too far, and that the major 
parties had ignored the 'moral' component of society (Jaensch & Mathieson, 1998, 
p.l94 ). The extreme nature of some of these parties means that they are unlikely to 
achieve significant public support and thus electoral success. Where parties do achieve 
significant public support, as in the case of One Nation, the major parties may move to 
incorporate, at least in part, the party's poiicy agenda. In the lead up to the 200 I federal 
election the Coaiition appropriated much of One Nation's policy on asylum seekers 
(Marr & Wilkinson, 2003, p.45-7, 93). Alternatively they may choose to shut the minor 
party out of preference arrangements. 
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Jaensch and Mathieson (1998, pp.l91-5) neglect lack of experience as a potential 
constraint to the success of minor parties. The lack of knowledge of the political system 
may lead to the development of poor party strategy. In 1998 high profile One Nation 
leader Pauline Hanson failed in her bid to win election to the House of Representatives 
for the Queensland seat of Blair. It is generally considered that if Hanson had run for 
the Senate instead of the House she would have been elected and One Nation may have 
grown rather than disintegrated (H. Phillips, personal communication, 15 October, 
2003; P. Van Onselen, personal communication, 15 December, 2004). mis strategic 
decision, however, is only one of the factors that contributed to the decline of One 
Nation. 
Conclusion 
'Constraints theory' provides a theoretical framework for explaining the Greens' 
underperformance at the 2004 federal election. 'Constraints theory' contends that 
institutional, political and internal party factors can hinder the electoral success of minor 
parties. Institutional constraints include the electoral systems for the House of 
Representatives and the Senate and the stability of Australia's two party system. The 
electoral thresholds for the House of Representatives and Senate are relatively high for 
the admission of minor party candidates. While minor parties have been much more 
successful at being elected to the Senate they are constrained by their dependence on 
preferences. Among the political constraints on minor parties is the hegemonic drive of 
major parties, economic conditions, whether a minor party has a geographically 
concentrated sectional base and the media. Internal party constraints encompass a 
minor party's leader, resources and funding, ideological and policy positions and 
experience. The following Chapter analyses the Greens' performance at the 2004 
federal election in relation to 'constraints theory'. 
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CHAPTER4 
ISSUES, BARRIERS ANn HIAS? 
The major constraints on the Greens' perfonnance at the 2004 federal election were the 
high electoral thresholds for the House of Representatives and the Senate, and the 
. Greens' relatively low election results. While Greens' leader Bob Brown and Greens' 
supporters have claimed that attacks on the Greens, particularly by the government and 
sections of the media, cost them votes and seats in parliament (Brown, 2005; Saliba, 
2005), the available evidence does not support such claims. Opinion polling and 
Australian Election Study (AES) data suggest the attacks on the Greens had little if any 
impact on the Greens' election results. Following the first week of the campaign, when 
attacks on the Greens were most pronounced, opinion polls showed an increase in 
support for the Greens (Newspoll!The Australian, n.d.; AC Nielsen, 2004; Roy Morgan 
Research, 2003a). W1rile AES data show public dislike for the Greens increased 
between the 2001 and 2004 elections it was insufficient to cost them seats in parliament. 
Newspoll, AC Nielsen and Morgan poll indicate that the terrorist bombing of the 
Australian Embassy in Jakarta during the election campaign had the most detrimental 
impact on the Greens' vote. However, even if the Greens had not lost support as a 
consequence of the bombing they still would not have been able to sunnount the 
institutional barriers that constrained their parliamentary result. 
Institutional Barriers 
The electoral system and the stability of the two party system posed the greatest 
constraints on Greens' candidates being elected to the House of Representatives. In the 
four House of Representatives seats where the Greens believed they had the strongest 
chances ofbeing elected their primary votes were too low. Despite polling just over 20 
percent of the primary vote in Cunningham, the Greens' Michael Organ was over 8 
percent behind Liberal candidate John Larter on first preferences. Even after the 
distribution of preferences Organ was only able to secure 24 percent of the vote before 
being excluded (AEC, 2005c ).23 In the seat of Sydney, Greens' candidate Jenny Leong 
polied 21.6 percent of the primary vote. While the Greens were 7 percent behind the 
Liberal candidate, there were insufficient preferences among the other candidates to put 
23 See Appendix E. 
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the Greens ahead of the Liberals (AEC, 2005d).24 Labor won the seats of Melbourne 
and Grayndler on first preferences. In the Seat of Grayndler Greens' candidate Philip 
Myers polled 2 I. I percent of the primacy vote and was just 3.2 percent behind Liberal 
candidate Stephanie Kokkolis. However, Labor's Anthony Albonese was able to win 
on the strength of his primary vote (AEC, 2005e )?5 In the seat of Melbourne Labor 
MHR Lindsay Tanner's fear of losing his seat to the Greens proved to be unfounded. 
While the Greens polled 19.0 percent of the primary vote and were 6 percent behind the 
Liberals' Jerry Dimitroulis, Tanner won the seat on first preferences (AEC, 2005f)?6 
The relatively high electoral threshold in the Senate coupled with the Greens' low 
Senate results in most of the states contributed to the Greens failure to win more Senate 
seats. In all states except Tasmania and Western Australia the Greens polled below the 
statistical average percentage of the primacy vote minor party candidates have achieved 
between 199027 and 2001 when elected to the Senate. In NSW the statistical average for 
candidates elected to the Senate between 1990 and 2001 was 8.2 percent of the primary 
vote. The Greens, however, only polled 7.3 percent. In Victoria the statistical average 
for election was 11.0 percent and the Greens polled 8.8 percent. In Queensland the 
mean score for being elected to the Senate was 10.3 percent and the Greens polled just 
5.4 percent. The mean score in South Australia was 13.2 percent while the Greens 
polled just 6.6 percent of the primacy vote. However, in Western Australia the Greens 
won election on 8.1 percent, compared to the mean score of 7.1 percent. Similarly in 
Tasmania the Greens' candidate was elected on 13.3 percent compared with the mean 
score of 9.6 percent (Newman, 2005, pp.50-4). While polling above the statistical 
average is not a sufficient condition for being elected to the Senate, the Greens' 2004 
results suggests that candidates that do so have a better chance ofbeing elected. 
Because minor parties are rarely able to reach a full quote on the strength of their 
primacy vote most depend on preferences to win Senate seats. Miragliotta (1999, p.3) 
has shown that innovative minor parties are able to overcome the relatively high 
electoral threshold to the Senate by engaging in strategic across house preference deals 
24 See Appendix E.l. 
25 See Appendix E.2 . 
. 
26 See Appendix E.3. 
27 1990 was the first normal half Senate election since the expansion of the Senate in 1984. In 1984 a 
penultimate Senator was elected from each state and in 1987 there was a double dissolution election 
(Newman, 2005, p.8). The period 1990 to 2001 is therefore used to provide a valid comparison of minor 
party Senate results. 
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with major parties. However, while the Greens entered into preference deals with Labor 
at the 2004 election they did not benefit from them. The Greens decided to give their 
preferences to Labor in thirty of the most marginal House of Representatives divisions 
and in the Senate in return for Labor preferences in the Senate across Australia. Greens' 
leader Bob Brown saw the preference deal with Labor as strategicaily important but also 
argued that Labor had a better range of policies than the Coalition (ABC TV Lateline, 
22 September 2004a). While the Greens entered into a preference agreement with the 
Democrats at the start of the election. campaign the Greens' deal with Labor generated 
acrimony between the Democrats and the Greens and caused the agreement to be 
broken. In retaliation against the Greens' preference deal with Labor the Democrats 
entered into a preference deal with Family First (ABC TV Lateline, 20 September 
2004b; Crabb & Heinrichs, 2004). 
Poor preference flows to the Greens coupled with the high rate of above-the-line voting 
contributed to the Greens' poor Senate resuit. The decision by Labor to preference the 
Family First Party ahead the Greens in Victoria and Tasmania meant the Greens tailed 
to win the final Senate place in Victoria and struggled to win the final place in 
Tasmania. Voting above the line gives parties greater power to determine where votes 
go (Miragliotta, 1999, p.92). Despite winning 8.8 percent of first preferences in 
Victoria the Greens lost the final seat to Family First, who received just 1.9 percent of 
first preferences (AECa, 2004, p.l20). Underlying Family First's success were their 
preference deals with the Democrats and Labor. Preferences from various 'micro-
parties' pusQ.ed Family First ahead ofthe Democrats whose preferences, and Labor's 
poor result, put Family First ahead of Labor's third candidate, Senator Jacinta Collins. 
Labor's preferences ensured Family First finished ahead of the Greens to win the final 
Senate seat in Victoria (The Poll Bludger, n.d.). 
In Tasmania Greens' Senate candidate Christine Milne received 13.3 percent of the 
primary vote, just one percent below a full quota. Despite Brown prematurely 
announcing Milne's victory early on election night, she only narrowly won the last 
Senate spot. The crucial factors in the Greens victory were the low number of 
candidates and the high rate, almost 20 percent, of below-the-line votes (The Poll 
Bludger, n.d. ). Tasmania has had a comparatively lower level of above-the-line votes 
since the introduction of above-the-line voting for Senate elections in the early 1980s 
(Miragliotta, 1999, p.92). Because preferences from below-the-line votes favoured the 
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Greens, Milne was able to win the final Senate place. If more Tasmanians voted above 
the line instead of below it, then it is most likely Family First's Jacquie Petrusma would 
have won the last Tasmania Senate seat (The Poii Bludger, n.d.). 
In contrast, in Western Australia the Greens were able to win the final Senate spot 
because of preference flows from Labor and the Democrats. Unlike in Victoria and 
Tasmania Labor placed the Greens second on their Western Australian voting ticket. 
While the Democrats also put Family First ahead of the Greens in Western Australia,28 
Family First's very low primary vote meant they were excluded from the Senate count 
before the Democrats, which ensured Democrat preferences flowed to the Greens (ABC, 
n.d.; ABC, 2004b ). The Greens were able to reach a full quota by receiving Democrats' 
preferences, 0.14 of a quota, and Labor surplus votes, 0.28 of a quota (The Poll Bludger, 
n.d. ). Democrat preferences were crucial to the Greens' failure to win a Senate in New 
South Wales. The Democrats preferenced Fred Nile's Christian Democratic Party 
ahead of the Greens. The elimination of Liberals for Forests' candidate Glenn Druery 
~ in the final rounds of counting pushed Fred Nile ahead of both Labor and the Greens. 
Because the Greens had fallen behind Labor Greens preferences meant that Labor won 
the final seat (The Poll Bludger, n.d.). 
While luck was the most significant factor in the outcome of the Queensland Senate 
race, the Greens did not poll strongly enough in South Australia. The Coalition was 
ultimately able to win four Senate seats in Queensland because the Liberal party and the 
Nationals ran on a split ticket. If the Liberals and Nationals had of run on a joint ticket, 
as the Nationals had been agitating, it would have been impossible for the Coalition to 
win a fourth seat and either the Greens or One Nation would have won the final Senate 
place (The Poll Bludger, n.d.; Bennett, Newman & Kropas, 2005, p.30). In South 
Australia Family First won 4.0 percent of first preferences and finished ahead of the 
Democrats. Democrat preferences flowed to Family First which pushed them ahead of 
the Greens. Tins locked up the preferences the Greens needed with Family First and 
ensured the elinllnation of the Greens in the final rounds of counting. However, even if 
the Democrats had finished ahead of Family First, preferences from Family First and 
then the Liberals would have given the final seat to the Democrats ahead of the Greens 
(The Poll Bludger, n.d.). 
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The Greens Under Attack 
Everyone Vs the Greens 
Throughout the 2004 federal election campaign the Greens came under sustained attack 
from a number of political parties and interest groups. ~Gonsistent with 'constraints 
theory' the government's attacks on the Greens represented the hegemonic drive ofthe 
major parties to protect their position and power. f' With opinion polls showing the 
Coaiition weil ahead on primary votes and Labor either neck and neck or ahead on the 
two party preferred vote, the government feared that Greens' preferences could deliver 
government to Labor. The government's policies on asylum seekers and Iraq led it to 
fear losing disaffected small '1' Liberal voters to the Greens (Middleton, 2004b). The 
government engaged in a scare campaign, utilising what Mayer (1980, p.355) calls the 
'weapon of smear and ridicule', against the Greens in order to stop a leakage of votes to 
Labor (Middleton, 2004f). On tlie first day of the campaign Prime Minister Howard 
told the media the government would draw attention to the Greens' policies to 
discourage traditional Liberal voters from voting for the Greens (Coleman, 2004b ). 
As part of the government's scare campaign against the Greens a number of senior 
ministers and Liberal party officials attacked the Greens. On the first day of the election 
campaign the Prime Minister attacked the Greens for what he referred to as their 
"kooky" policies (Bennett, Newman & Kropas, 2005, p.27). Treasurer Peter Costello 
warned voters that the Greens had both a 'soft' and a 'hard' edge. The Greens had a 
soft image in relation to trees and the environment but a hard edge in relation to their 
policies on 'legalising hard dnigs such as ecstasy andre-implementing death duties and 
increasing company tax' (Channel 10 Meet the Press, 5 September 2004b). Deputy 
Prime :Nfinister John Anderson went further by engaging in ad hmninem attacks on the 
Greens and their supporters. Anderson labelled the Greens 'watermelons' asserting that 
they were 'green on the outside and red on the inside' and that they were a 'home for 
people who in the 1950s would have joined the Cotmnunist Party' (Bennett, Newman & 
Kropas, 2005, p.27). In a further attempt to highlight the Greens' extremism, Anderson 
relabelled the Greens 'avocados: hard green outside, soft and mushy inside with a big 
brown nut in the middle' (Avocado? Melon? A fruitcake? 2004). The state director of 
'the Victorian Liberal Party, Julian Sheezel, also attacked the Greens: 
28 See Appendix F. 
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The Greens are social and economic radicals first, enviromnentalist 
second ... They want to limit us from having family barbecues but they [also] 
want to allow our kids to use dope freeiy (cited by Bennett, Newman & Kropas, 
2005, p.27). 
The government also used letterbox drops and advertising to warn voters against voting 
for the Greens. Part of the Coalition's scare campaign against the Greens incorporated 
letterbox drops in areas of high Greens' support. The Coalition's bright green A3-sized 
flyers warned voters about Greens' policies, especially in relation to drugs (Marriner, 
2004 ). In the final days of the campaign Liberal Party newspaper advertising warned 
voters about 'The Greens- Labor Dear: 
Fact 1: The Labor/Greens preference deal could hand government to Labor 
Fact 2: The Greens proposed "loopy laws" could get support form Labor and be 
passed. 
Advice: if you don't want Labor to get into government through a Labor/Greens 
preference deal, then give your first or second preference vote to the Liberals.29 
The Greens came under attack from a range of other sources. Although Labor courted 
Greens' preferences, Lindsay Tanner, the Labor member for Melbourne, labelled the 
Greens 'mad' and an anonymous Labor 'operative' called the Greens 'flaky, kooky, 
wacky, loopy and irresponsible' (Bachelard & Denholm, 2004). Democrat leader 
Andrew Bartlett criticised the Greens over their consistent support of Labor in the 
Senate in order to pmtray the Democrats as truly independent and therefore the real 
alternative to the major parties (Guerrara, 2004; Middleton, 2004a). The Family First 
Party attacked the Greens because they believed Greens' policies would hurt families 
(ABC TV The 7.30 Report, 4 October 2004a). Part of Family First's miliion dollar-
advertising budget was devoted to attacking the Greens' drugs policy (MacLean & 
Sinclair, 2004 ). The voiceover on Family First's television advertisement stated, 
"Heroin, ecstasy- the Greens want to legalise the lot They're going to give my kids 
easy access to marijuana," and exclaimed, "Bob, that's not greens, it's extreme" (ABC 
TV The 7.30 Report, 4 October 2004a; Manning & Rootes, 2005, p.404). However, 
Family First was forced to withdraw its advertisement after the Greens threatened legal 
action (Brown, 2004a; Drug ads irk Greens, 2004 ). The consistent negative publicity 
29 See Appendix G. 
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toward the Greens' drugs policy throughout the campaign forced them defend their 
policy with advertising. 30 
The Greens were also attacked by a number of interest groups. The Business Council of 
Australia condemned the Greens' economic policies. It warned voters the Greens' 
increased int1uence in the Senate could undermine economic growth by their policies of 
protectionism, barriers to foreign investment, government intervention and higher taxes 
(Uren, 2004; Business warns of Green threat, 2004). On the last days ofthe campaign 
Timber Communities Australia took out full-page advertisements in the HobartMercury 
and the Launceston Examiner entitled 'Recipe for a Green party' attacking the Greens 
economic and social policies31 (Bennett, Newman & Kopras, 2005, p.27-8). The Forest 
Industries Association of Tasmania warned voters about the influence ofthe Greens on 
a Labor govemment.32 The Australian Meat Industry Employees Union labelled the 
Greens a 'small and extremist minority' (Greens 'just extremists', 2004). 
Media Bias? 
Greens' leader Bob Brown and Greens' supporters have claimed that bias against the 
Greens by sections of the media cost the Greens votes and seats in parliament (Brown, 
2005; Saliba, 2005). Table 3 provides a summary of the news coverage of the Greens in 
Australia's major national and state newspapers during the 2004 federal election 
campaign period. The content analysis indicates that the overall coverage of the Greens 
was relatively balanced. Out ofthe 176 news reports on the Greens 58 were classified 
'unfavourable', 53 'neutral' and 65 'favourable'. Full details of the content analysis are 
provided in Appendix H. Wbile The Australian, The Age, The West Australian, The 
Advertiser and The Mercury presented relatively balanced coverage, The Sydney 
Morning Herald, The Courier Mail and the Herald Sun presented the most unbalanced 
coverage. While The Sydney Morning Herald had a ratio of 2 to I favourable to 
unfavourable stories it should be noted that many of the reports on the Greens in The 
Sydney Morning Heraid were brief articles of less than fifty words. The content 
analysis supports Bob Browns claims that the Herald Sun's reporting on the Greens was 
biased. The Herald Sun showed a ratio of3 to 1 unfavourable to favourable stories on 
30 See Appendix G.l. 
31 See Appendix G.2. 
32 See Appendix G.3. 
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the Greens. Unlike other newspapers it engaged in the most vituperative attacks on the 
Greens. 
Favourable reports on the Greens focused on the Greens' campaign launch (Middleton, 
2004c; Greens launch, 2004), Bob Brown's address to the National Press Club (Price, 
2004 ), Greens' candidates (Saunders, 2004a; Denhohn, 2004 ), and some Greens' 
policies (Hayes, 2004a; Hayes, 2004b). Unfavourable reports focused on Greens' 
policies, particularly Greens' drugs policy (Coleman, 2004b; McManus, 2004a; 
McManus, 2004b), and government attacks on the Greens (Karvelas, 2004; Rehn, 
2004).33 
Table 3 
News Coverage of the Greens in the Australian Press During the 2004 Federal Election 
Campaign Pertocf4 
Newspaper Unfavourable Neutral Favourable Total 
The Australian 7 '" 9 26 lU
The Sydney Moniliig Herald 5 9 12 26 
The Herald Sun 13 1 4 18 
The Age 3 5 7 15 
The Courier Mail 5 4 10 19 
The West Australian 7 8 8 23 
The Advertiser 5 10 3 18 
The Mercury 13 6 12 31 
Total 58 53 65 176 
The most noted example ofbias against the Greens appeared in the Herald Sun (Saliba, 
2005; Ramsey, 2005). In a report entitled "Greens policy backs illegal drugs" Herald 
Sun Report Gerard McManus provided an inaccurate and unbalanced report on the 
Greens' drugs policy. The opening paragraph of the report asserted, "Ecstasy and other 
illegal drugs would be supplied over the counter to young users in a radical policy 
framed by Senator Bob Brown's Greens" (McManus, 2004a). Greens' policy, however, 
only sought to find 'alternatives' to current drugs policy (APC, 2005). Following the 
.2004 election Greens' leader Bob Brown made a formal complaint about the Herald 
33 These references are provided as examples for a full list see Appendix H. 
34 See Appendix H. 
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Sun story to the Australian Press Council (APC) (Saliba, 2005; Ramsey, 2005). The 
APC's (2005) adjudication, handed down on 4 March 2005, found that the infonnation 
contained in the report was inaccmate and that it potentialiy damaged the Greens' 
electoral support. 
In the context of an approaching election, the potential damage was 
considerable. The achml electoral impact cannot be known, but readers were 
seriously misled (APC, 2005). 
Speaking to the Press Council's adjudication Senator Brown stated that the Herald Sun 
report was a malicious attempt to damage the Greens. 
This manufactmed news, which misled readers of Australia's highest circulation 
daily, is a disgrace to the profession of journalism. 
It perverted democracy. When a joW"nalist misinforms readers on their way to 
the ballot box democracy is sacrificed. 
This was no accident or mistake. The aim was to attack the Greens, not through 
the editorial column, but through the news pages. The outcome of the false 
concoction of the Greens policies was to lose om party tens of thousands of 
votes and, in my calculation, seats in parliament (Brown, 2005). 
Saliba (2005) went further, stating that the wide distribution of the Herald Sun story 
cost the Greens 'hundreds-of-thousands of votes' and Senate seats in Victoria, 
Queensland and South Australia. As outiined below the available evidence does not 
support these claims. 
A content analysis of opinion pieces on the Greens dming the federal election campaign 
period shows that there were many more negative pieces than positive pieces. Table 4 
indicates a strong editorial bias against the Greens. Out of the 29 opinion pieces on the 
Greens 21 were negative and 8 were positive, a ratio of2.6 to 1 against the Greens. For 
full details of the content analysis see Appendix I. The Herald Sun, The West 
Australian and The Australian had the highest ratio of negative opinion pieces to 
positive pieces. Only The Sydney Morning Herald defied the trend with two positive 
pieces and one negative opinion piece on the Greens. 
'Negative opinion pieces attacked the Greens over their policies and ideology. The 
Greens' economic and drugs policies received a particular battering (Pearson, 2004; 
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Murray 2004; Ackerman, 2004; Costello, 2004). Russell (2004), for example, asserted 
that 'the Greens' economic and tax policies would create a depression that would make 
the 1930s iook like an economic boom'. Lapkin (2004) criticised the Greens' defence 
policy and Sheridan (2004) attacked the Greens over their opposition to Australia's 
alliance with the United States. Ackerman (2004) attacked the Greens for their 'rabid 
irrational policies' while Bolt (2004a; 2004b) labelled the Greens' ideology 'toxic' and 
implied that they were anti-Semitic. Positive opinion pieces defended the Greens 
against attack (Norman, 2004; Brown, 2004b) and stated that the Greens were about to 
enter the mainstream (Pennells, 2004 ). 
Table4 
Opinion Pieces on the Greens During the 2004 Federal Election Campaign Period'5 
1 Newspaper I Negative I Positive I Total f 
The Australian £ 21 
ol 
u 0 
The Sydney Monring Herald 1 2l 3 
The Herald Sun 4 1 5 
The Age 2 1 3 
The Courier Mail 1 0 1 
The West Australian 4 1 5 
The Advertiser 1 1 2 
The Mercury 2 0 2 
Total 21 8 29 
Strong criticism of the Greens was not limited to the opinion pages of Australia's major 
newspapers. Prominent radio talkback host, Alan Jones, also savaged the Greens during 
the election campaign in an attempt to discourage people from voting for them. On his 
opinion slot on Channel Nine's Today show Jones hysterically attacked the Greens. On 
31 August Jones drew on McManus' Herald Sun report to attack the Greens over their 
drugs policy and a range of other policies. He labelied the Greens <ratbags' and their 
supports 'stupid'. He warned voters that if the Greens 'came dose to political power, 
Australia would be stufted' (Jones, 2004a). On 30 September, less than a two weeks 
out from the election, Jones again devoted his Today show slot to attacking the Greens' 
.policies. He warned voters the Greens would, decriminalise hard drugs, cut public 
funding to non-government schools, increase the Medicare levy, introduce over forty 
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new taxes, including taxes on the family home, and abolish the mandatory detention of 
asylum seekers (Jones, 2004b ). 
In line with 'constraints theory' the Greens had limited opportunities to defend 
themselves and their policies from attack. Although the Greens received greater media 
attention than other minor parties it was still insufficient to counter criticism from their 
opponents. Out of the 127 stories on minor parties and independents or 8 percent of 
total political coverage in The Australian and The West Australian newspapers during 
the election campaign, 62 stories or 4 percent of total political coverage focused on the 
Greens. 36 Almost 40 percent of these stories were unfavourable to the Greens. The 
Greens also had few television interview opportunities on Australia's premiere political 
programs. Greens' leader Bob Brown appeared once on Channel Nine's Sunday (5 
September 2004b) program and Channel Ten's Meet the Press (3 October 2004a). He 
was not interviewed on the main interview slot on the ABC's Insiders. 37 The Greens' 
limited advertising budget was insufficient to counter Liberal Party advertisements 
attacking the Greens38 (MacLean & Sinclair, 2004; Young, 2002, p.91). Although the 
attacks generated some media opportunities for the Greens, they lost control of their 
message to voters and had to devote many of their media opportunities to defending 
themselves and their policies. 
The attacks on the Greens, however, appear to have been counterproductive. The 
available evidence suggests that attacks on the Greens by the government, minor parties, 
interest groups and sections of the media had little if any detrimental impact on the 
Greens' election results. Opinion polling over the campaign period shows that in the 
first week of the campaign when attacks on the Greens were most pronounced, rather 
than support for the Greens going down it went up. A Newspoll survey conducted over 
August 27 to 29, the last poll prior to the government and media attacks, showed the 
Greens polling at 6 percent. The next Newspoll survey conducted over September 3 to 
5, after the initial government and media attacks, showed the Greens' polling up 2 
percent to 8 percent (Newspoll!The Australian, n.d.). A Morgan Poll conducted over 
August 14/15 and 21122, showed support for the Greens at 9 percent. Similarly, a 
35 See Appeudix I. 
.
36 See tables 2, 3 and 4. 
37 Insiders' archives can be assessed at http://www.abc.net.au/insiders/archives/2004/default.htm. 
38 The Liberal Party's advertisement 'The Greens-Labor Deal' (See Appendix G) appeared in a number of 
newspapers. See for example The Australian October 7, p.6 and October 9, p.4; The Sydney Morning 
Herald October 7, p.2 and October 9, p.20; The Age October 9, p. 7; The Courier Mail October 9, p. 12. 
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Morgan Poll conducted over August 28/29 and September 4/5, showed support for the 
Greens' up 1.5 percent to 10.5 percent (Roy Morgan Research, 2003a). AC Nielsen 
showed support for the Greens stable at 9 percent (AC Nielsen, 2004 ).39 
The Australian Election Study (AES) 2001 and 2004 suggests that between the 2001 
and 2004 federal elections Australians' increasingly disliked the· Greens and Greens' 
leader Bob Brown. Following the 2001 election 29.8 percent of respondents recorded 
neutral feelings about the Greens. 33.4 percent indicated that they liked the Greens and 
36.9 percent indicated that they disliked the Greens, with a subset of 10.8 percent 
indicating a 'strong dishke' for the Greens (AES, 2003a). Following the 2004 election 
the number of respondents with neutral feelings about the Greens fell to 21.6 percent. 
The number ofrespondents that liked the Greens remained stable at 31.0 percent. The 
number of respondent who disliked the Greens increased to 4 7.2 percent. The largest 
increase was among the subset of respondents who 'strongly disliked' the Greens, 
which rose 7 percent to 17.8 percent (AES, 2005a). Austrahans' feelings about Bob 
Brown similarly changed. The number of respondents who had neutral feeling about 
Brown fell from 40.6 percent in 2001 to 28.3 percent in 2004. The number of people 
who expressed a 'strong dislike' for Brown increased from 11.3 percent to 19.7 percent 
(AES, 2003b; AES, 2005b ). 
However, a cross-tabulation of respondents' feelings about the Greens and Bob Brown 
with respondents' 'own left-right positions' indicates that the greatest increase in strong 
dislike for the Greens was among those on the hard right. While respondents with 
centrist views who strongly disliked the Greens increased moderately from 10.6 percent 
to 15.7 percent, respondents on the hard right who strongly disliked the Greens 
increased substantially from 25.0 percent to 49.2 percent (AES, 2003c; AES, 2005c). 
Similarly, while strong dislike for Brown went up moderately among centrists from 
11.1 percent to 17.6 percent, it increased significantly among those on the hard right, 
from 18.4 percent to 46.8 percent (AES, 2003d; AES, 2005d). The Australian Election 
Study does not indicate when or why Australians' feelings about the Greens changed. 
However, the data indicate that even if the attacks on the Greens during the 2004 
election campaign were responsible for the shift in Austrahans' feelings about them, it 
primarily influenced those on the hard right, people who would not have voted for the 
Greens anyway (AES, 2005e; AES, 2005t} 
39 See Appendices A to A.2. 
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The Australian Embassy Bombing 
Until the terrorist attack on the Australian Embassy in Jakarta on 9 September 2004, 
toward the end of the second week of the campaign, terrorism and national security 
issues were largely at the periphery of the campaign. Except for comments by Richard 
Clark, former counter-terrorism advisor to US Presidents Bill Clinton and George W. 
Bush (Kerin & Colman, 2004; Middleton, 2004g), and Attorney General Pbiitip 
Ruddock's comments on the Beslan school massacre (Benham, 2004; Nicholson & 
Shaw, 2004), the threat of terrorism to Australia was mostly excluded from the 
campaign. The Embassy bombing, however, thrust national and international security 
issues to the centre of the campaign (Middleton, 2004e ). Security issues remained 
centre stage throughout the third week of the campaign following a hoax announcement 
that Iraqi insurgents had taken two Australian contractors hostage and would to execute 
them unless Australian forces were withdrawn from Iraq (Allard, 2004; Seccombe & 
Allard, 2004 ). With polling showing the Coalition better able to handle national 
security issues (AES, 2005g; AES, 2005h; Middleton, 2004d) the Prime Minister sought 
to keep national security and the threat of terrorism on the agenda by restating his pre-
emptive strike doctrine (Ruse & Middleton, 2004; Crabb, 2005, pp251-2; Latham, 2005, 
p.342). 
While the bombing of the Australian Embassy has been considered in analyses of the 
outcome of the election (Bennett, Newman & Kopras, 2005, pp.15-16) it has been 
neglected in analyses of the Greens' election performance. The bombing appears to 
have caused the greatest drop in support for the Greens. While multiple factors 
influence opinion polls the bombing overshadowed other issue and remained the 
dominant issue during the brief campaign hiatus (Moore & Romples, 2004; Mitchell, 
Dodson & Moore, 2004; Channel Nine's Sunday, 12 September 2004a). It was also a 
dominant theme in the leaders debate on Sunday 12 September. Despite Newspoll and 
Morgan Poll showing an increase in support for the Greens at the end of the first week 
of campaigning, all three polls showed a drop in Greens' support immediately following 
the Embassy bombing. Newspoll showed support tor the Greens drop from 8 percent to 
6 percent (NewspollfThe Australian, n.d.). AC Nielsen (2004) showed the Greens' 
·support drop from 9 percent to 8 percent. Morgan Poll showed a drop of2.5 percent 
from 10.5 percent to 8 percent (Roy Morgan Research, 2003a). All three polls indicate 
that the drop in support for the Greens mostly shifted to the Coalition government. 
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While Newspoll and Morgan Poll showed slight increases in support for the Greens in 
the weeks after the bombing, Greens' support never returned to levels prior to the 
bombing (Newspoli/The Austraiian, n.d.; AC Nielsen, 2004, Roy Morgan Research, 
2003a). However, even if the Greens had retained the 1 to 1.5 percent they lost in the 
polls as a consequence of the bombing, it would have been insufficient to surmount the 
institutional barriers that constrained the Greens' election performance. 
Conciusion 
'Constraints theory' provides an adequate theoretical framework for explaining the 
Greens' underperfonnance at the 2004 federal election. The high electoral thresholds in 
the House of Representatives and the Senate and the Greens' relatively low election 
results were the dominant constraints on the Greens. The Greens' low results made 
them dependant on preferences and because they did not receive adequate preference 
flows they were unable to win seats. The government's attacks on the Greens represent 
the drive by the major parties to maintain their position and power in the Australian 
poiitical system. While the Greens had limited media opportunities to defend 
themselves against attack, the available evidence does not support claims that the 
attacks cost the Greens votes and seats in parliament. Polling and AES data suggest the 
attacks on the Greens had little if any impact on the Greens' election results. Polling 
indicates the terrorist bombing of the Australian Embassy in Jakarta during the election 
campaign had the most detrimental impact on the Greens' vote. However, even if the 
bombing had not occurred the Greens would not have been able to surmount the 
institutional factors that constrained their parliamentary result. Wlrile 'constraints 
theory' provides an adequate framework in relation to institutional factors, it does not 
explain why the Embassy bombing caused some potential Greens' voters to shift their 
support to the government. This suggests that 'constraints theory' could be extended to 
include terrorism as a potential political constraint to the electoral success of minor 
parties. 
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CHAPTERS 
THESIS CONCLUSION 
In the lead up to the 2004 federal election campaign the Greens appeared poised to 
perform strongly. The collapse of the Democrats and disaffection among sections ofthe 
public over the major parties' stance on asylum seekers and the Iraq war fed support for 
the Greens. By the start of the 2004 election campaign opinion polls, the Commentariat 
and the Greens' leadership were fuelling expectations of a strong Greens' election 
result. Opinion polls showed support for the Greens running at between 6 and 10 
percent and the Commentariat were predicting the Greens could win between four and 
seven Senate seats. The Greens' leadership was optimistic of winning Senate seats in 
every state and possibly the ACT. It was widely expected that the Greens would share 
the balance of power in the Senate with the remaining Democrat Senators. Greens' 
leader Bob Brown was also confident of winning seats in the House ofRepresentatives. 
Brown even raised the prospect of an accord with the major parties in the event that the 
Greens held the balance of power in a hung parliament. The Greens, however, had just 
two candidates elected to the Senate, bringing their total to four, and failed to win 
election to the House of Representatives. Indeed, the Howard government increased its 
majority in the House ofRepresentatives and gained control ofthe Senate, thus denying 
the Greens a share of the balance of power. 
Chapter Two showed the expectations placed on the Greens were too high, but that the 
Greens nevertheless under performed at the 2004 federal election. Expectations that the 
Greens would win up to seven Senate seats and enter the House of Representatives were 
unrealistic. A comparison of the Greens' polling with the Democrats past Senate results 
suggests that the Greens were unlikely to win five to seven Senate seats. A prediction 
that the Greens could have won four Senate seats would have been more plausible. But 
the Greens even failed to reach this. Expectations that the Greens could win seats in the 
House of Representatives were even more unreaiistic. 1he history of minor party 
contests for the House of Representatives shows no minor party candidates have been 
successful at winning election to the House of Representatives at a general election in 
the post-war period. Even high profile minor party candidates have failed to come ciose 
to being elected to the House of Representatives. 
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Having shown that the Greens under performed in Chapter Two, Chapter Three outlined 
'constraints theory' as a theoretical model for explaining why the Greens under 
performed. 'Constraints theory' is a convenient term for Jaensch and Mathieson's 
(1998) application of Hauss and Rayside's (1978) theory of party formation to the 
success and failure of minor parties in Australia. 'Constraints theory' contends that 
institutional, political and internal factors hinder the electoral success of minor parties. 
Institutional factors included the electoral system and the two party system. Political 
factors include the behaviour of the major parties, economic conditions and whether a 
minor party has the support of a geographically concentrated base. Internal constraints 
encompass a minor party's leader, finances and resources, ideological and policy 
positions and political experience. 
Chapter Four showed that 'constraints theory' provides an adequate framework for 
explaining why the Greens under performed at the 2004 federal election. Wnile the 
Greens confronted a range of issues during the 2004 election campaign, institutional 
factors provided the dominant constraint on the Greens' election result. The high 
electoral thresholds for the House of Representatives and the Senate, coupled with the 
Greens relatively low election results, were the fundamental reasons why the Greens 
failed to have more candidates elected to either chamber. In every state, except Western 
Australia and Tasmania, the Greens polied below the statistical average of the primary 
vote minor party candidates have achieved when elected to the Senate. Because the 
Greens were unable to reach a full quota in the Senate they were dependant on other 
parties for preferences. While the Greens sought to maximise their electoral chances by 
entering into across house preference deals with Labor, strong preference flows against 
them meant they faiied to have more candidates elected to the Senate. 
Attacks on the Greens and the terrorist bombing ofthe Australian Embassy in Jakarta 
were the two major issues the Greens confronted during the 2004 election campaign. 
Much has been made of the barrage of attacks on the Greens by the government and 
sections of the media. The Greens, like other minor parties, had limited media 
opportunities to defend themselves against the attacks. In line with 'constraints theory' 
the government sought to protect its position and power by attacking the Greens in order 
to discourage traditional Liberal voters from voting for the Greens. A content analysis 
of newspaper reports and opinion pieces (see Appendices H and I) was also presented in 
Chapter Four to establish whether there was systematic bias against the Greens during 
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the election campaign. The content analysis revealed that only the Herald Sun 
presented biased news coverage against the Greens. Opinion pieces ran against the 
Greens by a ratio of 2.6 to 1. Nevertheless, opinion polling and AES data suggest the 
attacks on the Greens had little if any detrimental impact on the Greens' election results. 
While opinion polls suggest the Australian Embassy bombing had the greatest 
detrimental impact on the Greens' vote, it too was unlikely to have cost the Greens seats 
in parliament. While 'constraints theory' provides a wide explanatory framework for 
analysing the underperformance of minor parties, it fails to provide insight into why 
voters shifted their support from the Greens to the government in the aftermath of the 
Australian Embassy bombing. This suggests 'constraints theory' could be extended to 
include terrorism as a potential political constraint to the electoral success of minor 
parties. 
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APPENDIXC 
2004 Federal Election Results: House of Representatives46 
Party NSW Vic Qld WA SA Tas ACT NT Aust 
Lib/Nat/CLP 45.4 46.7 49.1 48.7 48.4 42.0 35.2 43.8 46.7 
+2.6 +4.6 +3.6 +6.4 +2.5 +4.9 +2.8 +3.3 +3.7 
ALP 36.7 40.4 34.8 34.7 36.8 44.6 50.3 44.3 37.6 
+0.3 -1.2 +0.1 -2.4 +3.0 -2.6 +3.3 +1.4 -0.2 
DEM 1.1 1.1 1.4 1.5 1.9 .. 2.4 2.4 1.2 
-3.2 -5.2 -2.9 -3.2 -8.7 .. -5.6 -2.9 -4.2 
GRN 8.1 7.5 5.1 7.7 5.4 9.9 10.8 6.2 7.2 
+3.3 +1.6 +1.75 +1.7 +1.8 +2.1 +3.7 +2.2 +2.2 
FFP 0.8 2.4 3.7 0.2 4.3 2.8 .. 1.1 2.0 
+0.8 +2.4 +3.7 +0.2 +4.3 +2.8 .. +1.1 +2.0 
PHON 1.4 0.1 2.0 2.5 1.1 .. .. .. 1.2 
-3.4 -1.1 ,-5.1 -3.8 -3.6 .. .. . . -3.2 
Other 6.6 1.8 4.0 2.1 4.6 0.7 2.2 1.4 4.0 
+0.4 -1.0 -0.8 +1.1 ...!-(\ '7 +0.1 -1.4 -1.2 -0.4 IV./ 
46 Sources: Australian Electoral Commission (2004a, pp. 89-91), Newman (2005, pp.32-3). 
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APPENDIX C.l 
Greens' Primary Vote by House of Representatives Division47 
I Division %vote %swing 
Sydney (NSW I ALP) 21.61 +6.92 
Grayndler (NSW/ALP) 21.08 +8.02 
Cunningham (NSW/ ALP) 20.13 +13.49 
Melbourne (Vic/ ALP) 18.98 +3.21 
Bennalong (NSW/Lib) 16.37 +12.34 
Denison (Tas/ ALP) 14.60 +4.15 
Melbourne Ports (Vic/ ALP) 14.10 +2.82 
Batman (Vic/ALP) 13.93 +') "'\LI. ...... ,.., . 
Wills (Vic/ ALP) 13.00 +4.72 
Kooyong (Vic/Lib) 12.54 +1.82 
Richmond (NSW/ ALP) 12.37 +2.31 
North Sydney (NSW/Lib) 12.33 +4.67 
Newcastle (NSW I ALP) 11.93 +4.41 
Warringah (NSW;Lib) 11.81 +8.12 
Fremantle (W AI ALP) 11.78 +2.72 
Curtin (WA/Lib) 11.48 +2.23 
Bradfield (NSW /Lib) 11.45 +4.76 
Higgins (Vic/ ALP) 11.35 +2.54 
Frazer (ACT/ALP) 11.30 +3.42 
Franklin (Tas/ ALP) 11.18 +1.45 
Wentworth (NSW/Lib) 11.15 +1.38 
Macquarie (NSW/Lib) 10.85 +2.43 
Page (NSW/Nat) 10.82 +3.62 
Mackellar (NSW /Lib) 10.48 +2.41 
Canberra (ACT/A_LP) 10.17 +3.92 
Throsby (NSW/ALP) 10.11 +5.61 
Fairfax (Qld/Lib) 10.09 +4.61 
Lyons (Tas/ ALP) 9.95 +2.91 
Ryan (Qld/Lib) 9.76 -1-A 'l Q 11.-'U 
Berowna (I'~S\V/Lib) 0 hfl -1-A A') J.VV '•·•.k 
p---Ll ... (W A/ AT m ta UI J-\.Lr J 9.58 +2.22 
Latrobe (Vic/Lib) 9.41 +2.01 
Cowper (NSW/Nat) 9.32 +3.80 
Brisbane ( Qld/ ALP) 9.26 +2.70 
Lowe (NSW/ALP) Y.24 +5.04 
Gellibrand (Vic/ ALP) 9.08 +2.78 
Griffith (Qld/ALP) 8.99 +3.55 
Charlton (NSW/ ALP) 8.95 +4.01 
Goldstein (Vic/Lib) 8.86 +2.45 
Forrest (W A/Lib) 8.45 +1.28 
Jagajaga (Vic/ALP) 8.31 +1.74 
47 Source: Australian Electoral Commission (2005a, pp.l30-206). 
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Swan (WA/ALP) 8.29 +2.41 
Bass (Tas/Lib) 8.10 +1.86 
Adelaide (SA/ ALP) 7.99 +2.02 
Robertson (NSW /Lib) 7.95 +4.63 
Shortland (NSW/ALP) 7.89 +3.77 
Casey (Vic/Lib) 7.87 +0.98 
Deakin (Vic/Lib) 7.86 +1.56 
Pearce (W AJLib) 7.85 +0.63 
Tangney (W A/Lib) 7.80 +2.77 
Gil.'llore (NSW/Lib) 7.78 +2.29 
McEwen (Vic/Lib) 7.65 +0.41 
Mayo (SA/Lib) 7.60 +2.13 
Cm·angamite (Vic/Lib) 7.51 +1.19 
Eden-Monaro (NSW /Lib) 7.44 +2.46 
Kingsford Smith 7.37 +0.10 
(NSW/ALP) 
Chisholm (Vic/ ALP) 7.34 +1.17 
Fowler (NSW/ALP) 7.34 +4.89 
Isaacs (Vic/ ALP) 7.31 +3.35 
Stirling (W A/Lib) 7.15 +1.17 
Boothby (SA/Lib) 7.11 +3.93 
Moore (W A/Lib) 7.08 +1.66 
Barton (NSW/ALP) 6.95 +4.05 
Bendigo (Vic/ ALP) 6.93 +1.29 
Cook (NSW/ALP) 6.92 +3.36 
Hasluck (W A/Lib) 6.86 +1.19 
Maribyrnong (Vic/ ALP) 6.86 +2.17 
Hughs (NSW/Lib) 6.79 +2.23 
Solomon (NT/CLP) 6.77 +1.63 
Watson (NSW/ALP) 6.77 +3.29 
Ballarat (Vic/ ALP) 6.73 +0.07 
0' Connor (W A/Lib) 6.73 +2.00 
Hume (NSW/Lib) 6.50 +2.16 
Leichhardt ( Qld/Lib) 6.47 +1.23 
Menzies (Vic/Lib) 6.46 +0.97 
Hunter (NSW/ALP) 6.44 +1.92 
Indi (Vic/Lib) 6.43 +2.47 
Kalgoorlie (WAJLib) 6.33 +2.55 
Flinders (Vic/ ALP) 6.27 +0.39 
Dunkley (Vic/Lib) 6.24 +0.62 
Mitchell (NSW!Lib) 6.20 +3.07 
Sturt (SA/Lib) 6.06 +2.28 
Fisher (Qld/Lib) 6.05 +1.87 
Chifley (NSW/ALP) 6.04 +4.33 
Corio (Vic/ ALP) 5.91 +1.55 
Dickson (Qld/Nat) 5.87 +2.35 
Lilley (Qld/ALP) 5.63 +1.88 
· Braddon (Tas!Lib) 5.61 +0.13 
Cowan (W AI ALP) 5.59 +1.53 
Lingiati (NT/ALP) 5.58 +2.78 
59 
Port Adelaide (SA/ ALP) 5.42 +1.561 
Hotham (Vic/ ALP) 5.39 +1.04 
Moreton (Qld/Lib) 5.31 +1.47 
Prospect (NSW/ALP) 5.31 +0.73 
Kingston (SA/Lib) 5.30 +1.96 
Parramatta (NSW/ALP) 5.30 +2.21 
Calwell (Vic/ALP) 5.26 +1.91 
Reid (NSW/ALP) 5.25 +2.24 
Bruce (Vic/ ALP) 5.24 +1.07 
McPherson (Qld/Lib) J:;:1Q +0.25 -'• .l.V 
Hindmarsh (SA/ALP) 5.11 +1.49 
Gorton (Vic/ ALP) <:11'1 +2.04 J.lV 
Canning (W A/Lib) 5.05 -0.31 
Scullin (Vic/ALP) 5.03 +2.23 
Do bell (NSW /Lib) 5.02 +2.07 
Herbert (Qld/Lib) 5.02 +2.30 
Moncrieff (Qld/Lib) 4.98 +0.72 
Bonner (Qld!Lib) 4.93 +1.92 
Aston (Vic/Lib) 4.86 +1.32 
Brand (W AI ALP) 4.83 +1.35 
Bowman (Qld/Lib) 4.79 +2.18 
Lyne (NSW/Nat) 4.76 +1.79 
Banks (NSW/ALP) 4.68 +1.87 
Blaxland (NSW/ALP) 4.64 +2.02 
Petrie (Qld/Lib) 4.62 +1.93 
Gwidir (NSW/Nat) 4.48 +2.76 
McMilla.n (Vic/T~ib) 4.48 -0.89 
Macarthur (NSW/Lib) 4.47 +1.42 
Holt (Vic/ ALP) 4.46 +1.74 
Wide Bay (Qld/Nat) 4.43 +2.32 
Oxley (Qld/ALP) 4.40 +1.05 
Gippsland (Vic/Nat) 4.38 +0.46 
Wannon (Vic/Lib) 4~35 +0.66 
Riverina (NSW/Nat) 4.30 +1.87 
Fadden (Qid/Lib) 4.24 +0.96 
Paterson (NSW/Lib) 4.16 +1.44 
Wakefield (SA/Lib) 4.15 +1.00 
Lalor (Vic/ ALP) 4.12 -0.49 
Barker (SA/Lib) 4.08 +0.98 
Forde (Qld/Lib) 4.08 +1.07 
Groom (Qld/Lib) 4.00 +0.45 
Longman (Qld/Lib) 3.98 +1.00 
Makin (SA/Lib) 3.79 +1.47 
Mallee (Vic/Nat) 3.78 +1.47 
Greenway (NSW/Lib) 3.60 +0.96 
Farrer (NSW/Lib) 3.59 +0.17 
Kennedy (Qld/Ind) 3.53 +1.40 
·Li..'ldsay (NSW/Lib) 3.49 +1.00 
Parkes (NSW/Nat) 3.42 +0.89 
Hinkler (Qld/Nat) 3.33 +0.88 
60 
New England (NSW/Ind) 3.33 +1.07 
Grey (SA/Lib} 3.30 +0.87 
Dawson (Qld/Nat) 3.19 +0.74 
Werriwa (NSW/ ALP) 3.13 +0.48 
Rankin (Qld/ ALP) 3.09 +0.34 
Murray (Vic/Lib) 3.05 +0.64 
Blair (Qld/Lib) 2.94 -0.20 
Calare (NSW/Indl 2.30 +0.77 
Capricornia (Qld/ALP) 2.05 +0.54 
Maranoa (Qld/Nat) 2.00 +0.08 
61 
APPENDIXD 
2004 Federal Election Results: Senate48 
Party NSW Vic Qld WA SA Tas ACT NT Aust 
Lib/Nat!CLP 44.1 44.1 44.9 50.2 47.9 46.1 37.9 45.4 45.1 
+2.3 +4.5 +0.8 +7.7 +2.4 +7.3 +3.6 +1.7 +3.3 
ALP 36.4 36.1 31.7 32.5 35.5 33.5 41.1 41.4 35.0 
+0.9 -0.7 -0.0 -1.7 +2.5 -3.3 -0.9 +2.2 +0.7 
DEM 2.2 1.9 2.2 2.0 2.4 0.8 2.1 4.7 2.1 
-4.0 -5.9 -4.5 -3.9 -10.2 -3.8 -8.6 -2.6 -5.1 
GRN 7.3 8.8 5.4 8.1 6.6 13.3 16.4 7.6 7.7 
+3.0 +2.8 +2.1 +2.2 +3.2 -0.5 +9.1 ' +3.3 .L'l. '?. J ,.)I.;J 
FF 0.6 1.9 3.4 0.8 4.0 2.4 .. .. 1.8 
+0.6 +1.9 +3.4 +0.8 +4.0 +2.4 +1.8 
PHON 1.9 0.7 3.1 2.4 1.1 .. .. .. 1.7 
-3.7 -1.8 -6.9 _A t:;. -0.6 -3.3 -2.2 -4.7 _'l Q --r.v -_,;Ou 
Other 7.5 6.5 9.3 3.9 2.5 3.9 2.6 0.9 6.7 
1 1 
-0.9 +5.1 -0.7 +1.9 +1.2 1 [\ +0.1 +0.6 -I. I -r.v 
48 Sources: Australian Electoral Commission (2004a, pp.120-122); Newman (2005, p.54-5). 
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APPENDIX G.l 
Greens' Political Advertising: 'Greens' Policies Save Children's Lives'55 
ADVERTISEMENT 
GREENS' POLICIES SAVE CHILDREN'S LIVES 
.... 
Dear Friend, 
Over ma..'ly years, as a doctor and as ·a senator, I have advised young people to avoid 
illicit drugs. I have also worked to help addicts (people caught up in drugs and huit:ing 
both themselves and others) w·-ged)ack to a good life in society. 
Two factors make dr..:tg abuse worse. One is the criminal dealers- they should be 
jailed. The other is the narrow view that c:riminalises young addicts -and d,.'"ives their 
activities underground. 
ln this election, notable for the other pa..'i:ies avoiding drug policies, the Greens have 
been targeted by the Murdoch tabloids, the Coalition and religious right, even though 
our policies would reduce the death toll fi::orr; drug misuse i.'i Australia.· On the other 
ha.c'ld, Fa.c-nily First, ·when asked for its drugs policy this week, did not produce any. 
Here are some points the religious.right parties will not face. 
• The Greens back tough laws to jail drug dealers. 
·• We want youngsters who get caught up with hard drugs to get help. They should 
not be left abandoned in back alleys. The religious right should read about the 
Good Samaritan. 
• Prohibition breeds cri.ille and corruption. 
• Overseas experience tri.alling policies w'b.Jch reduce the death rate from addiction 
should be co~sidered here. A -referendum in Switzerland won 70% popular 
support for heroin treatment clinics, because they reduce harm. 
• Highly qualified police, medical experts and ev~n right wing think tanks support 
harm minimisation. 
Harm minimisation has been successfully implemented in countries like Canada, 
Switzerland and Portugal. We advocate its adoption in Austi:al.i.a· to save young 
Austi:al.i.an lives. 
Yours sincerely 
~·-
SenatOr Bob Brown 
Australian Greens 
1 October 2004 .Bob Brown-
+ L---------------------------------~------~----~_o_,_.&m_. __ .s_~ _._M_a_n_ne_~ _  ·_ro_s_u_l~-in_~_-~  ._~ __ TAS--·7-0oo __.~-----J 
36 llla Advertiser www.theadvertlser.com.au lllursday, October 7, 2004 
55 Source: The Advertiser, p.36 (2004, October 7). 
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APPENDIX G.2 
Timber Communities Australia: 'Recipe for Establishing a Green Party'56 
1. OPPOSE job creation 
2. OPPOSE major investment in Tasmania 
3. OPPOSE all e<:onomic growth 
4. OPPOSE a sustainable foresfrndustry 
fP ,;; . 
5. PROMOn a population redltctiotr$' 
6. PROMOn an open door on 
7. PROMOn social drug use, 
8. PROMOTE vegetarianism 
9. PROMOn public funding 
10. PROMOn higher dole 
11. PROM01i higher 
~B!own! ~-cc~lf~ 
: · Chnst1ne Milne a~d \.. SUPPORT TASMANIA 
The Greens revel an li 
d • !I re ucing Tasmania t 
.. to a bitsket case ••• 
· ••• they've done it 
_,efore and they 
will do it again. 
56 Source: Th~ Mercury, p.44 (2004, October 8). 
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APPENDIX G.3 
Forest Industries Association of Tasmania: 'A Latham Puppet Government' 57 
A 
GOVERN ME 
1---Al-lHBrown used to talk 
about having Ha firm 
:hand on the shoulder of 
government". Now he 
I ,wants to pull the strings, 
i : 
-Labor's forests policy 
confirms Bob Brown 
is the Puppeteer and 
tham the Puppet. 
...................... 
A Latham Labor Governmen ··will be 
a Puppet Government of the Greens. 
Authorised by Terry Edwards, Forest Industries Association of Tasmania, 38 Montpelier Retreat, Battery Point 7004. 
Source: The Mercury, p.15 (2004, October 7). 
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APPENDIXH 
Content Analysis of News Reports on the Australian Greens in the 
Australian Press During the 2004 Federal Election Campaign Period 
Date Title . Reporter( s) Page Classification 
The Australian 
· 30 August Greens turn king makers M. Saunders 5 Neutral 
31 August 'Kooky' policy agenda for Greens E. Coleman 4 Unfavourable 
1 Greens eye the balance of power M. Bachelard 6 Neutral 
September M.Denhohn 
Brown returns :fire on his drugs E. Coleman 6 Unfavourable 
policy 
3 Greens pose threat to future D. Uren 8 Unfavourable 
September growt..P., says business group 
7 Brown & co 21st century P.Karvelas 7 Unfavourable 
September 'commies' 
Industry body backs Greens' S. Hayes 34 Favourable 
tech policy 
9 Bobbing blissfully in days of M. Price 7 Favourable 
September sunshine 
13 Flavour of protest still strong M. Saunders 6 Favourable 
September for Organ 
Live with planet, not off it: G. Kaszubska 8 Favourable 
Brown 
Greens preference 'blank' poised E. Coleman 8 Neutral 
to fell Labor 
17 Greens flirt with Howard B. 1 Neutral 
September Norrington 
M.Denholm 
Omens look good for rising star M. Denholm 6 Favourable 
Of Greens 
18/19 Labor & Greens do national IS. Lewis 6 Neutral 
September deal A McGarry 
20 Greens threaten Dems in West ! R Martin 6 Neutral 
September I I 
Voters overlook tax policy for G. 7 Neutral 
trees Megalogenis 
22 Howard sees ALP in Hock S. Lewis 7 Unfavourable 
September with Greens 
24 Greens in bid to cut rebate on M. Bachelard 7 Favourable 
September insurance 
28 Greens patch it up to rout M. Saunders 6 Neutral 
Septe1p..ber Turnbull 
Greens say buy back Telstra S. Hayes 34 Favourable 
shares 
29 Greens object to Family First M. Bachelard 7 Favourable 
September 'dirty work' M.Brockman 
72 
2/3 October Preference deal a wony for N. Wilson 10 Neutral 
Beazley 
Greens lose the wilderness vote M. Bachelard 10 Unfavourable 
B. Lane 
4 October 'Unholy alliance' holds Latham's S. Lewis 1 Unfavourable 
key to Lodge 
5 October 'Besieged' Greens boosted E. Coleman 8 Favourable 
7 October Greens in blue-ribbon seats M. Brockman 7 Neutral 
could be gold 
The Sydney Morning Herald 
30 August Preferences key, but no decision CBanham 8 Favourable 
yet 
Green power surge i11 ru .... 'l for n.a. 28 ~~eutral 
Senate seats as Democrats dive 
Anning high in seats of discontent C. Matriner 28 NeutTal 
1 Minors to do deal n.a. 9 Neutral 
September 
Drug policy defended n.a. 9 Unfavourable 
3 Business group on Green alert as l Garnaut 8 Uniavourable 
September Brown extemalises · 
Greens square up to Labor in S. Peating 9 Favourable 
dormitory town cliff-hanger 
4 Howard promise to save trees and L. Dodson 9 Neutral 
September jobs 
6 Independents' day as new A Contractor 6 Neutral 
September government faces minority rule 
Democrats leader attacks Greens n.a. 6 Unfavourable 
record 
We're on for young and old: A Contractor 17 I Favourable 
Brown 
7 Greens tmder the bed D. Murphy 8 Unfavourable 
September 
8 Labor not so green n.a. 10 Neutral 
September 
9 Greens offer pact with winner A Contractor 6 Favourable 
September 
11 Every Ridgeway but lose: One A Contractor 10 Neutral 
September Nation, many preference deals 
and a Greening of the electoral 
vme 
13 Jakarta attack result of policy: J. Garnaut 6 Favourable 
September Wilkie 
17 Labor deal may give Greens M. Seccombe 9 Neutral 
September second NSW Senator T. Allard 
23 Brown sets deadline n.a. 9 Favourable 
September 
Greens to block funding increases L. Dodson 11 Favourable 
to private schools 
28 King's bid to woo Greens bits a J. Pearlman 6 Neutral 
September rocky patch 
73 
1 October How green is Brown's valley P. Snow 18 Favourable 
4 October Greens want aid boost n.a. 6 Favourable 
Greens vote lift makes it third A. Contractor 7 Favourable 
force, poll shows 
5 October Coalition letter drop to scare C. Marriner 7 Unfavomable 
Green voters 
8 October Greens line up for Labor over A. Contractor 9 Favourable 
forests 
9 October Greens expect forest backlash n.a. 12 Favourable 
Herald Sun 
30 August Polls shmv Greens are sprouting G. :rv1clvianus 8 Unfavourable 
31 August Greens back illegal drugs; open G. McManus 3 Unfavourable 
door plan for all refugees; family 
home tax; gay marriage nod 
31 August Dual policy on dmgs G. McManus 4 Unfavourable 
1 Red-faced Brown backs off G. McManus 5 Unfavourable 
September Greens' drug ideas M.Hanrey 
3 Farmers fear the Greens could J. 27 Unfavomable 
September damage their patch Masanauskas 
11 Brown keen for alliance G. McManus 12 Unfavomable 
September 
13 Howard cops Green blast n.a. 4 Favourable 
September 
Greens at the ready M. Harvey 24 Neutral 
18 No deal with Greens G. McManus 7 Unfavourable 
September 
20 Liberals back 'wacky' Greens G. McManus 2 Unfavourable 
September 
27 Fear of Senate control n.a. 11 Favourable 
September 
28 Brown lashes Right L. Heywood 12 Favourable 
September 
2 October F crests the big issue G. McManus 28 Unfavourable 
6 October Anti-drug chiefblasts Greens N. Wilson 5 Unfavourable 
Greens tipped to make $4m profit L. Mcilveen 30 Unfavourable 
on election 
7 October 40 taxes on longer wish list G. McManus 13 Unfavourable 
8 October Greens kick up a pe\v 1 n.a. 27 Favourable 
9 October Right little earner: Greens policy M. 7 Unfavomable 
shows how cru'lle can pay Zonneveldt 
The Age 
30 August Politics in a darker shade of green J. Koutsoukis 7 Neutral 
1 Greens on the boil, as Liberals go B. Nicholson 1, 8 Neutral 
September on attack 
2 Wilkie finds deep pockets in 1::5. Nicholson 10 l:'avourable 
September disgruntled voters 
'3 Ureens under attack J. Gordon l) Unfavomable 
September 0. Guerrara 
6 'Labor-Green bloc' warning 0. Guerrara 7 Unfavourable 
74 
September 
7 Anderson sees red over M. Blenkin 6 Unfavourable 
September 'watermelon' Greens 
9 Greens ready to deal: Brown M. Shaw 8 Favourable 
September 
12 Solar power to the people, say P. Hudson 10 Favourable 
September Greens 
13 Roar of the crowd and smell of J. Green 9 Favourable 
September patchouli add colour to bid 
18 Greens strike a preference deal A Crabb 9 Neutral 
September with Labor 
21 Greens threaten key Labor seats, A. Crabb 7 Neutral 
September with Lib help M. Fyfe 
23 Greens vow to end spending on n <> 1(\ Favourable .I..I..U. ~v 
September wealthy private schools 
26 Greens tipped to double vote in P. Hudson 11 Neutral ~~ 
September Labor seat 
8 October Victorian Green with his ey on the :M. Fyfe 9 Favourable 
Senate 
9 October Sap rises as Greens loom in third A Darby ; ; Favourable 11 
party role 
The Courier Mail 
30 August Hutton looks a chance for Senate M. Cole 5 Favourable 
spot L. Heywood 
3 Greens. Business concerns n.a. 7 Unfavourable 
September 
4 Greens leader says it's teamwork L. Mcilveen 10 Favourable 
September 
6 Minor parties poised to claim C. Jones 4 Neutral 
September balance of power, says Brown 
I ~eptember Coalition mudslinging fails to C. Jones 9 Favourable corral Greens 
9 Greens leader dismisses a Red L. Mcilveen 15 Unfavourable 
September herring 
Greens. No sale pledge n.a. 15 Favourable 
10 Democrats see red over Green Lll J. Walker 8 Neutral 
September roads L.Heywood I __ ! ___ --
--
11 Preference for Green puts Brown J. Walker 8 Favourable 
September in hot seat 
13 Coalition paints Greens black G. Johnstone 4 Unfavourable 
September 
15 Greens. Water key to deal n.a. 5 Favourable 
September 
16 Greens jump on the band wagon :M. Phillips 15 Favourable 
September 
19 Greens strike deal with Labor n.a. 15 Neutral 
September 
20 Greens good for Labor as L. Johnstone 5 Neutral 
September Democrats keep fading 
28 Greens siam 'faceless' deals L. Heywood 4 Favourable 
75 
September 
2 October Drug ads irk Greens n.a. 4 Unfavourable 
4 October Greens. Labor backed n.a. 5 Favourable 
5 October Greens. Workplace bid n.a. 9 Favourable 
7 October Greens. No negotiations n.a. 16 Unfavourable 
The West Australian 
1 Greens policy spells out line on n.a. 9 Neutral 
September drug use 
3 Business warns of Green threat n.a. 9 Unfavourable 
September 
6 Labor warned on Green vote D. Grand 10 Neutral 
September 
Greens claim backing from n.a. 11 Favourable 
young, over 50s 
7 Exchange adds fruit flavour to n.a. 10 Neutral 
September campaign 
Brown to launch Green policy in n.a. 10 Neutral 
WA visit 
9 Brown to deal with either side K. Middleton 7 Favourable 
September 
Greens are in the fight this time K. Middleton 7 Favourable 
13 Greens launch attack on Howard K. Middleton 11 Favourable 
September 
Wilkie targets PM on security n.a. 11 Favourable 
after bombing 
Rock rhythms set mood for tree n.a. 11 Unfavourable 
lovers 
17 Avocado? Melon? A fruit cake? n.a. 9 Unfavourable 
September 
20 Greens deal lifts Labor hopes D. LeGrand 11 Neutral 
September K. Gauntlett 
21 Scare ploy has helped us: Siewert K. Gauntlett 10 Favourable 
September 
Greens plan higher taxes C. Russell 10 Unfavourable 
22 Former spook stalks PM R. Taylor 11 Favourable 
September 
24 Ban party donations, says Brown D. Grand 10 Favourable 
September 
25 Blue-ribbon seats tum blue K. Middleton 8 Neutral 
September 
Greens to pick up four seats, says n.a. 8 Neutral 
Brown 
29 Greens protest over drug peddling n.a. 10 Unfavourable 
September advert 
Bartlett blasts Greens over Labor K. Middleton 10 Unfavourable 
2 October Beazley see red over Greens R. Taylor 11 Unfavourable 
voting rebuff 
·4 uctober Brown throws down gauntlet on n.a. 6 Neutral 
old forests 
76 
The Advertiser 
31 August Greens seek radical drug reforms G. McManus 7 Unfavourable 
1 Swap deal in Senate n.a. 8 Neutral 
September 
Anger at drug policy n.a. 8 Unfavourable 
3 Greens 'good managers' n.a: 5 Neutral 
September 
4 How the Greens vote rates in the T. 11 Neutral 
September Central Market Richardson 
The farmer who is in Bob L. Mcilveen 29 Neutral 
Brown's green comer 
10 W aming on Greens n.a. 11 Unfavourable 
September 
13 Greens launch n.a. 6 Favourable 
September 
18 Forget it, PM tells Greens on B. Littlely 21 Neutral 
September policy 
20 Greens warn Labor n.a. 13 Neutral 
September 
21 Greens a marginal help to Labor P. Starick 5 Neutral 
September G. Kelton 
Senate hopefuls great sacrifice L. Craig 22 Favourable 
Party time. The Greens D. Clarke 37 Neutral 
22 Greens on rise n.a. 6 Neutral 
September 
23 Wilkie on visit n.a. 7 Favourable 
September 
25 Anderson's Green envy n.a. 19 Unfavourable 
September 
29 Greens angered by ads n.a. 31 Unfavourable 
September 
2 October Fringe dwellers C. Bildstien 31 'Neutral 
The Mercury 
31 August Greens unveil radical policy G. McManus 3 Unfavourable 
1 Greens sla..m campaign to ha..rm E. \Vhinnett 4 Unfavourable 
September policies 
Bob's lack of understanding n.a. 5 Unfavourable 
2 Flak keeps flying on drug policy A Rehn 4 Unfavourable 
S~ember 
4 Nonnally silent partner speaks his L. Mcilveen 7 Unfavourable 
September mind on Bob 
5 Brown calls on Lennon to act n.a. •7 Neutral 
September 
7 Anderson fears Reds under the A Rehn 4 Unfavourable 
September Greens 
Greens back single zone n.a. 4 Favourable 
'8 Greens bash by PM backfires n.a. 5 Favourable 
September 
Brown offers stuffed koalas n.a. 7 Neutral 
77 
9 Greens under the bed won't work, L. Mcilveen 4 Unfavourable 
September says Brown 
13 Milne set for Senate return C. 1-2 Favourable 
September Waterhouse 
S. Bailey 
14 Greens make a devout Christian C. Konkes 8 Unfavourable 
September see red 
More women need electing to I'1.a. 8 Favourable 
reflect society, says Milne 
15 Greens call for ban on super n.a. 4 Favourable 
September trawlers 
16 Greens rescue plan for forests n.a. 3 Favourable 
September 
Greens would do away with states E. Whin.."flett 7 Unfavourable 
Greens demand action of super n.a. 20 Favourable 
trawlers 
17 Nat mushes Green avocado n.a. 4 Unfavourable 
September 
Han·adine not a Green n.a. 5 Unfavourable 
19 Labor-Greens vote deal n.a. 4 Neutral 
September 
Democrats spiteful, says Mi1ne H. Chog 4 Neutral 
20 Brown prefers quick decision D. Rose 5 Favourable 
September 
Green hop sys he is only Hanson n.a. 5 Favourable 
rival 
22 Greens call for national plan to M. Paine 8 Favourable 
September halt T assie pests 
23 Greens preference pledge n.a. 9 Neutral 
September 
25 Brown tips Greens increase n.a. 10 Favourable 
September 
29 Greens 'just extremists' n.a. 4 Unfavourable 
September 
5 October Brown hails Labor breakthrough D. Rose 2 Favourable 
8 October Greens push for $500 wage for L. Mcilveen 4 Unfavourable 
prisoners 
Labor wins Greens preferences E. Whinnett 6 Neutral 
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APPENDIX I 
Content Analysis of Opinion Pieces on the Australian Greens in the 
Australian Press During the 2004 Federal Election Campaign Period 
Date Title Commentator Page Classification 
The Australian 
2 September Green is not the political go Editorial 12 Negative 
No third party insurance G. Sheridan 13 Negative 
4/5 Extremist shade of Green C. Pearson 20 Negative 
September 
6 September Leaders discover it's not easy being Editorial 10 Negative 
Greens 
7 September Attacks on Brown wont fool voters J. Norman 15 Positive 
15 Fretful candidates feeling a bit M. Steketee 15 Positive 
September Green 
'){\ BroV\-'11 forsakes forests for poll ease G.1"v1ilne 11 Negative -<..V ~~ 
September 
1 October Save life as we know it -put the TI T"'lo • r. ueVllle 13 Negative 
Greens in parliament 
The Sydney Morning Herald 
11 Green? It's colour code for Red C. Twyman 51 Positive 
September 
27 The other guards may end up being A Lohrey 1'1 Positive 
September green too - with envy 
6 October Green on the outside, empty inside T. Lapkin 19 Negative 
Herald Sun 
31 August Herald Sun EDITORIAL Editorial 20 Negative 
1 September Greens means mad A Bolt 19 Negative 
23 When crazy joins loopy P. Costello 24 Negative 
September 
28 Greens: what you will get B. Brown 20 Positive 
September I 
7 October Dark shade of Green Editorial 24 Negative 
The Age 
12 The 'watermelon' once again makes A Masterson 10 Negative 
September a colourful interlude 
21 How the Liberals can take revenge G. 13 Negative 
Septetn ber on Bob Brown Henderson 
27 Are Brown's Greens really feral? A Lohrey 11 Positive 
September 
The Courier Mail 
5 September Why Green should be last on all A Bolt 56 Negative 
vote cards 
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The West Australian 
7 September Pure Green credentials apt to fade T. Rutherford 19 Negative 
18 Green outside, red ink inside C. Russell 77 Negative 
September 
21 Preferences are poll revenge G. 17 Negative 
September Henderson 
25 Beware the lurker in the forest P. Murray 19 Negative 
September 
8 October Greens w1Jl hit the mai..nstream S.Pennells 16 Positive 
The Advertiser 
30 August A strong voice B. Brown 18 Positive 
2 October Not the time for political Editorial 28 Negative 
experiments 
The Mercury 
20 Green grow poll deals G. Barnes ..... 1 Negative L.l 
September 
If you want to go nowhere ... P. Akerman 21 Negative 
80 
